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SUMMARY 
The objective of this Thesis is to answer whether Article 20 of the Commercial Law of Latvia 
is compatible with freedom of contract principle. 
Embarking on the path towards the answer to this research question, Chapter 1 analyzes the 
limitation put on freedom of contract principle in case of a transfer of an undertaking set in 
Article 20 and the purpose of such limitation. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of a transfer of 
an undertaking as a way to structure asset purchase deal that may be accompanied by 
additional complications – liability rule set in Article 20 that limits freedom of contract of the 
transferor and the acquirer of an undertaking. After establishing the existence of the limitation 
on freedom of contract and its purpose, the Thesis moves research to freedom of contract 
principle.  
Chapter 2 begins by defining freedom of contract principle and outlining its scope. Then it 
proceeds to analyze the way freedom of contract principle manifests in contemporary legal 
framework, both in Latvian normative acts and European Contract Law. Lastly, Chapter 2 
analyses whether the European Contract Law, similarly as Latvian normative acts, contains 
provisions limiting freedom of contract for the protection of third parties, in particular, 
creditors.  
The analysis undertaken in Chapter 2 determines that, while freedom of contract is a 
component of a fundamental right, it is not an absolute right. In certain cases, limitations on 
freedom of contract principle are justified. Therefore, the existence of the limitation on 
freedom of contract principle in Article 20 does not in itself make Article 20 incompatible 
with freedom of contract principle. What is crucial, is determining when freedom of contract 
principle and when governmental intervention needs to prevail. 
Chapter 3 continues the research of freedom of contract principle. It traces the development of 
this principle through ages, firstly, studying its origins and philosophical underpinnings and 
then analyzing the most vivid historical case law related to this principle. A look into 
historical development of freedom of contract principle confirms that freedom of contract is 
an important concept supported by the majority of legal scholars, even though to varying 
extents. At the same time, historical case law indicates the need for balance between freedom 
of contract principle and the necessity of governmental interference. Analysis of the historical 
development of freedom of contract principle demonstrates that determining, when freedom 
of contract principle should prevail, and, when, on the other hand, governmental intervention 
is justified, requires in-depth examination.  
For this purposes Chapter 4 introduces evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations 
on fundamental rights in Latvia. Chapter 4 begins by arguing that freedom of contract is a 
component of the fundamental right to freedom and therefore evaluation methodology used 
for assessing limitations on fundamental rights, can be used for assessing limitations put on 
freedom of contract principle as well. 
Chapter 5 proceeds to apply introduced evaluation methodology to the limitation on freedom 
of contract set in Article 20. In the course of the analysis it is concluded that one out of three 
evaluation criteria is not met, in particular, Article 20 does not comply with proportionality 
criterion.   
Based on the results of the evaluation, the Thesis concludes that Article 20 is incompatible 
with freedom of contract principle. Considering that freedom of contract, while a component 
4 
of fundamental, is not an absolute right, the existence of the limitation on freedom of contract 
principle in Article 20 does not itself make Article 20 incompatible with freedom of contract 
principle. Limitation is incompatible only if unjustly limiting freedom of contract. In this 
Thesis in order to determine whether limitation on freedom of contract set in Article 20 is 
justified, evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on fundamental rights is 
applied. Based on the results of the evaluation, it is concluded that Article 20 is incompatible 
with freedom of contract principle. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past years, all three Baltic States have experienced an increase in merger and 
acquisition activity. In 2017, the accumulated value of publicly available Baltic merger and 
acquisition deals reached almost two billion euro. Noteworthy, that in terms of announced 
merger and acquisition deals Latvia was almost at par with Estonia and ahead of Lithuania. 
This proves that Latvian companies get increasingly more attractive for investors.
1
 Mergers 
and acquisitions are a crucial part of any healthy economy. It is widely accepted that they are 
beneficial not only for the companies and for their shareholders taking part in the transactions, 
but for the economy in general as well. 
Having achieved such good results, now for Latvian economy it is important to maintain 
merger and acquisition market growth rates at least on the same level. In order to so, it is 
crucial to ensure attractive legal environment compatible with an open, market-oriented and 
competitive international economic order, which according to UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts (hereinafter – UNIDROIT Principles) is based on 
freedom of contract principle.
2
 
Therefore, existence of legal environment attractive for potential investors is conditional on 
compliance with freedom of contract principle. Without doubt, there are many legal 
provisions in Latvian normative acts concerning mergers and acquisitions that need to be 
assessed in order to ensure that they comply with freedom of contract principle. However, the 
objective of this Thesis is not to list all provisions in Latvian normative acts in respect of 
mergers and acquisitions that possibly infringe on freedom of contract principle. This Thesis 
analyses the compatibility with freedom of contract principle of one single provision – 
Article 20 of the Commercial Law of Latvia. This provision establishes the liability rule in 
case of a transfer of an undertaking or its independent part, from which no derogation is 
allowed. 
Therefore, the primary research question this Thesis attempts to answer is whether Article 20 
is compatible with freedom of contract principle. 
All Chapters of the Thesis, each having different objective, contribute to finding an answer to 
the research question. 
The main objective of Chapter 1 is to introduce limitation put on freedom of contract principle 
in case of a transfer of an undertaking set in Article 20 as well as purpose of this Article. 
Having introduced Article 20 as provision limiting freedom of contract principle, in order to 
determine whether such limitation on freedom of contract principle can be justified, the 
Thesis moves research towards understanding freedom of contract principle. 
Understanding freedom of contract principle is the main objective of Chapter 2. Firstly, it 
attempts to define it and outline its scope. Then Chapter 2 proceeds to analyze the way 
freedom of contract principle and its various limitations manifest in contemporary legal 
framework, both in Latvian normative acts and European Contract Law.  
                                                          
 
1
 Prudentia. M&A Folio. Baltic M&A Overview. January – December 2017. Available on: 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/d56a0d_0902d99c69ce4218bb62e8827b384a67.pdf. Accessed on 03 May 2018.  
2
 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts. UNIDROIT International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law, 2004, comment to Article 1. 
6 
Chapter 3 continues to study freedom of contract principle. In particular, its main objective is 
to take a look into historical development of this principle. Chapter 3 begins by studying 
origins and philosophical underpinnings of the freedom of contract principle. Then it proceeds 
to analyze the most vivid historical case law related to this principle. 
After historical case law counsels caution in respect of freedom of contract principle, the 
Thesis establishes the need for in-depth analysis for determining when limitations on freedom 
of contract principle are justified and when, on the other hand, freedom of contract principle 
should prevail.  
Established need for in-depth analysis results in the introduction of the evaluation 
methodology for assessing limitations on fundamental rights in Chapter 4. The objective of 
Chapter 4 is to outline this evaluation methodology and determine the possibility to apply it to 
Article 20. 
Finally, Chapter 5, attempting to answer the research question, applies evaluation 
methodology for assessing limitations on fundamental rights to Article 20. 
To address aforementioned questions Latvian, European and International primary and 
secondary legal sources are analyzed. In the framework of research, different research 
methods are used. Historical method is utilized, when introducing and studying the 
development of such concepts as transfer of an undertaking and freedom of contract. This 
method is particularly present in the analysis of freedom of contract principle as it is used to 
trace the development of this principle through ages. Particular attention is paid to the 
development of this principle and the most vivid historical case law in the USA. In turn, 
comparative method is used in order to compare legal rules in respect of allocation of liability 
in case of an asset purchase deal, in particular, in case of a transfer of an undertaking, in 
Latvia with legal rules in other legal systems, in particular, the USA. Comparative method is 
utilized also in the analysis of freedom of contract principle. In the Thesis it is compared how 
freedom of contract principle manifests in Latvian normative acts, on the one hand, and 
European Contract Law, on the other hand. Also, the Thesis adopts analytical method, when 
studying and comparing different sources and opinions of different scholars. Finally, to 
answer research question evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on 
fundamental rights in Latvia is applied to Article 20. 
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1. THE LIMITATION ON FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN CASE OF A TRANSFER OF AN 
UNDERTAKING 
1.1. Allocation of liability in case of an asset purchase deal, in particular, in 
case of a transfer of an undertaking, in Latvia 
There are different ways how to structure an acquisition deal. This Chapter introduces one 
typical acquisition technique – purchase of assets. It outlines advantages of this acquisition 
technique as well as risks associated with it. In particular, this Chapter analyses one main risk 
that arises in case if an asset purchase deal takes a form of a transfer of an undertaking in 
Latvia, namely, imposition of liability on the acquirer for the debts of the transferor.  
In Latvia, acquisitions usually take a form of share purchase or asset purchase deals. The 
choice between these types of transactions usually depends on their advantages and 
disadvantages. Structuring transaction as an asset purchase deal has quite a few 
disadvantages. Firstly, there may be complications related to the transferability of particular 
assets (for example, licenses or registrations). Secondly, sometimes it is impossible to transfer 
assets without receiving certain third party consents (for example, in case of databases). 
Thirdly, there are numerous ambiguous legal issues related to asset purchase deals (for 
example, it is unclear, if it is possible to reregister prohibition notations in favor of the seller 
of the business in the Land Register to the name of the acquirer of the business).
3
  
However, despite a number of listed disadvantages, business acquisitions are quite often 
structured as transfers of assets from one company to another. For example, General Motors 
and Chrysler used this method in their bankruptcy reorganization after the global financial 
crisis.
4
 This indicates that asset purchase deals have not only disadvantages, but advantages as 
well. 
G. W. Tetler, when writing about structuring business acquisitions in the USA, claims that the 
main inducement for a buyer to structure a transaction as an asset purchase deal is concern 
about the liability for the obligations of the seller. As a rule, structuring the transaction as an 
asset deal is the safest way for the buyer to avoid or at least minimize the risk of being 
responsible for unknown liabilities of the acquired business. In share purchase deals, the 
company retains all of its liabilities and obligations regardless of whether they are known or 
unknown to the buyer. This is the case because the acquired company does not change in 
form, changed are only the owners of its shares.
5
 
In turn, as G. W. Tetler explains, when the transaction is structured as an asset purchase deal, 
the parties usually conclude an agreement listing assets that the buyer is willing to acquire, as 
well as liabilities that he is willing to assume. When negotiating the division of liabilities 
between the buyer and the seller, what is usually taken into consideration, is the reason why 
transaction is structured as an asset purchase deal. For example, if the seller and the buyer 
                                                          
 
3
 Tidwell, International Asset Transfer: An Overview of the Main Jurisdictions: a Practitioner's Handbook, p. 
343. 
4
 Matheson, «Successor liability», p. 371. 
5
 Tetler, «Asset acquisitions: important considerations», p. 3; 6. 
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agree on the sale of the entire business of the seller, but structure the deal as an asset purchase 
deal for tax optimization and other technical reasons, it may be correct for the buyer to 
assume all or at least the majority of the liabilities of the seller. This way parties could avoid 
or at least minimize disruption to the operation of the business. For example, the buyer may 
assume liabilities of the seller arising out of agreements for the performance of services or the 
manufacture and delivery of goods. In turn, if the transaction is structured as an asset purchase 
deal because the buyer wants to eliminate risk of being responsible for certain liabilities of the 
seller, in particular unknown liabilities, the parties may expressly agree to limit the liability of 
the buyer in asset purchase agreement. One of the main advantages of structuring the 
transaction as an asset purchase agreement is this option available to the buyer of «picking 
and choosing» what liabilities he is willing to assume and what he expressly wishes to avoid.6 
Subject to certain exceptions, in the USA the legal presumption is that in contrast to share 
purchase deals in case of an asset purchase deal the buyer is not responsible for liabilities that 
he has not expressly agreed to assume in the asset purchase agreement.
7
 
In respect of the general rule that the buyer does not assume any of the seller’s liabilities in 
case of transfer of assets the Supreme Court of the USA declared over 120 years ago that: 
«[t]his doctrine is so familiar that it is surprising that any other can be supposed to exist».8 
Explaining the consequences of imposing on the buyer the liability for the debts of the seller, 
John H. Matheson provides simple example. For example, person A wishes to sell his car, 
worth approximately 10’000 EUR to person B. The car in question is still under the loan and 
the loan has 9’000 EUR balance. Person B wants to buy the car and pays to the person A 
9’500 EUR for it. The deal seems beneficial for both person A and person B. Person B now 
owns the car, but person A has money to pay the loan and leave the rest to himself. However, 
what happens if person A does not repay the loan? Will person B be liable for the debt of the 
seller? As a rule the answer is no. If person B thought that he would be liable for the debt of 
person A, most likely he would not pay him for the car 9’500 EUR. The price would be much 
lower.
9
 
However, while the answer to this question seems obvious, in fact it is not always so 
straightforward. In certain cases, even in case of an asset purchase deal the buyer may end up 
being liable for the debts of the seller even if he did not expressly assume them. In particular, 
in Latvia such is the case if an asset purchase deal takes a form of a transfer of an 
undertaking. In such a case Article 20 of the Commercial Law of Latvia (hereinafter – Article 
20) that allocates liability in case of transfer of an undertaking or its independent part is 
applicable.  
Of course, not all sale of assets constitutes transfer of an undertaking. If in the framework of 
asset purchase deal genuine piece-by-piece asset transfer takes place, then it is not transfer of 
an undertaking.
10
 For determining, when transfer of an undertaking takes place, meaning of 
the term «undertaking» is crucial. Article 18 of the Commercial Law of Latvia defines an 
undertaking as an organizational economic unit, which includes both tangible and intangible 
                                                          
 
6
 Supra note 5, pp. 6-7. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Fogg v. Blair, 133 U.S. 534, 538 (1890). 
9
 Supra note 4, p. 371. 
10
 Supra note 3, p. 343. 
9 
things belonging to a merchant, as well as other economic benefits (value), which are used by 
the merchant to perform commercial activities.
11
 The Commentary to the Commercial Law of 
Latvia clarifies that the aim of the undertaking is performance of the commercial activity, i.e. 
profit making. An undertaking is not legal subject, but rather an object – an instrument, which 
is used for the performance of commercial activity.
12
 Further, in accordance with the 
Commentary to the Commercial Law of Latvia in order to conclude that transfer of an 
undertaking has taken place, it is necessary to establish that an undertaking or an independent 
part thereof was transferred to the acquirer and he can use it without significant changes. If 
the acquirer can continue the relevant commercial activity using an undertaking, then it is 
considered that transfer of an undertaking has taken place regardless if some insignificant part 
of an undertaking was left to the transferor. It is also noted that Article 20 relates not only to 
transfer of the title (sale, gift, exchange, inheritance, etc.), but also to any other transfer of an 
undertaking to the possession of another person, for example, lease of the undertaking.
13
 
However, while there is a definition of what constitutes an «undertaking», applying this 
definition to factual situation is quite challenging, which gives rise to legal uncertainty. Until 
recently, case law in relation to the transfer of an undertaking was very limited and 
ambiguous. There were cases, when Latvian courts, analyzing whether transfer of an 
undertaking has taken place, came to opposing conclusions in respect of similar situations.
14
 
For example, in the decision of March 10, 2014 in case No. C29715111Rīga District Court 
recognized transfer of an undertaking, when SIA «Latvijas Keramika A» invested in equity 
capital of AS «Latvijas Keramika» its real estates as well as some movable assets.15 Rīga 
District Court has made such a decision even though the previous year, the Supreme Court of 
Latvia in the decision of November 5, 2013 in case No. C04367311 established that transfer 
of an undertaking did not take place even though SIA «Mežlejas» similarly as in previous 
case transferred to SIA «Cerība Pluss» both real estates and movable assets.16 This ambiguity 
resulted in many individuals not knowing whether what they were doing was in fact transfer 
of an undertaking. Consequently, individuals did not know whether liability rules set in 
Article 20 applied.  
However, it must be noted that during the time this Thesis was written the case law in respect 
of a transfer of an undertaking was supplemented, as the Supreme Court of Latvia issued 
important judgements clarifying what criteria need to be assessed when analyzing if transfer 
of an undertaking has taken place. The Supreme Court of Latvia in the decision of November 
09, 2017 in case No. SKC 340/2017 ruled that the following components could indicate that 
transfer of an undertaking took place: transfer of employees to the acquirer, transfer of assets 
and stocks, takeover of bank liabilities, transition of the board members of the transferor to 
the acquirer.
17
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 The Commercial Law of Latvia, 13 April 2000. Available on: https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=5490. Accessed on 
10 April, 2018, Article 18. 
12
 Strupišs, Komerclikuma komentāri. A daļa. Komercdarbības vispārīgie noteikumi (1.-73. panti) 
(Commentaries on Commercial Law. Part A. General conditions of commercial activity), p. 101. 
13
 Supra note 12, pp. 113; 115. 
14
 Spriedums lietā Nr. (Decision in case No.) C29715111, Rīga District Court (2014); Spriedums lietā Nr. 
(Decision in case No.) C04367311, the Supreme Court of Latvia (2013). 
15
 Spriedums lietā Nr. (Decision in case No.) C29715111, Rīga District Court (2014). 
16
 Spriedums lietā Nr. (Decision in case No.) C04367311, the Supreme Court of Latvia (2013). 
17
 Spriedums lietā Nr. (Decision in case No.) C33355814, the Supreme Court of Latvia (2017). 
10 
Legal certainty in respect of determining what constitutes transfer of an undertaking is crucial, 
because if an asset purchase deal is recognized as a transfer of an undertaking, additional legal 
rules apply. For example, in case of a transfer of an undertaking, under both Latvian and 
European law the employees of such an undertaking are automatically transferred with the 
undertaking. However, while safeguarding of employees' rights in case of a transfer of an 
undertaking is fascinating and widely discussed topic, it falls outside the scope of this Thesis. 
This Thesis concerns another legal rule – previously mentioned liability rule set in Article 20, 
which applies only in case of a transfer of an undertaking.  
In Latvia, if an asset purchase deal takes a form of a transfer of an undertaking Article 20 is 
applicable. This Article establishes solidary liability of the transferor and acquirer of an 
undertaking in respect of liabilities, which originated before the transfer of the undertaking 
and are to be fulfilled in the five year period after the transfer. For all of the other liabilities of 
such an undertaking, Article 20 imposes a liability on the acquirer. 
In particular, Article 20 Part one stipulates that: 
[i]f an undertaking or an independent part thereof is transferred to the ownership or 
use of another person, the acquirer of the undertaking shall be liable for all the 
obligations of the undertaking or its independent part.
18
  
While special procedure set in the same Article 20 Part 1 stipulates that: 
in respect of those obligations which arose prior to the transfer of the undertaking or 
its independent part to the ownership or use of another person, and the terms or 
conditions for the fulfilment of which come into effect five years after the transfer of 
the undertaking, the transferor of the undertaking and the acquirer of the undertaking 
shall be solidary liable.
19
 
Having established this liability rule, Article 20 in Part three proceeds to state that «[a]n 
agreement, which is in contradiction to the provisions of this Section, shall be void as to third 
parties».20 
This means that even if the acquirer and the transferor agree on different liability scheme than 
what is set in Article 20, such agreement shall be void as to third parties. So, the transferor 
and the acquirer have the right to agree on another liability scheme, for example, they can 
agree that the acquirer is not liable for the debt that originated prior to transfer of an 
undertaking at all. However, while Article 20 allows to conclude such an agreement, it also 
explicitly states that it shall be void as to third parties. It means that if the transferor and the 
acquirer conclude an agreement releasing the acquirer from the liability for obligations that 
arose before transfer of an undertaking, the creditor can still choose to ask for satisfaction 
from / bring a claim against the acquirer. In such a case, the acquirer cannot object on the 
basis of the agreement concluded with the transferor. The acquirer is obligated to fulfill the 
obligation in accordance with the law. However, it still must be noted, that after the acquirer 
has fulfilled an obligation to the creditor, he can raise a claim to recover the respective 
amount from the transferor on the basis of concluded agreement.
21
 However, while there is a 
possibility to recover paid amount from the transferor, in this case Article 20 Part three still 
adversely affects the acquirer. If the creditor requests so, the acquirer is obligated to pay him 
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 Supra note 11, Article 20, Part 1. 
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 Ibid, Article 20, Part 1. 
20
 Ibid, Article 20, Part 3. 
21
 Supra note 12, p. 116. 
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the debt. This means that he has to pay the money that he could otherwise invest somewhere, 
so they could bring him interest, or use it for the expansions of his business, or use it for any 
other purpose. In turn, recovering paid amount from the transferor may result in lengthy court 
proceedings. Therefore, it is clear that Article 20 restricts freedom of contract of the transferor 
and the acquirer to agree on different liability scheme than what is set in Article 20, as such an 
agreement shall be void as to third parties. 
To sum up, this Section introduced asset purchase deal as an acquisition technique with its 
advantages and disadvantages. As one of the main inducements the option available to the 
buyer of «picking and choosing» what assets he is willing to acquire and what liabilities he is 
willing to assume was mentioned. However, it turns out that such an option is not available if 
an asset purchase deal takes a form of a transfer of an undertaking in Latvia. Article 20 
contains mandatory rule allocating liability in case of a transfer of an undertaking. Next 
Section aims to take a look at how another national legal system addresses the issue of 
liability in case of an asset purchase deal, in particular, the USA. 
1.2. Allocation of liability in case of an asset purchase deal in the USA 
Previous Section established the existence of the liability rule in case of a transfer of assets, in 
particular, transfer of an undertaking, in Latvian legal system. In turn, this Section aims to 
take a brief look at another legal system, trying to determine whether there are similar legal 
rules. 
As already mentioned, in the USA the general rule is that of the non-liability of the buyer for 
the debt of the seller. When one company transfers all of its assets to another company, 
acquiring company does not assume the liabilities of the transferor, solely because of its 
succession to ownership of the assets. However, there are exceptions to the general rule of 
non-liability of the buyer. There are four main traditional exceptions to the rule of non-
liability.  In the Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co. case the following exceptions are listed 
1) the acquirer expressly or impliedly assumes liability of the seller, 2) the transaction is a de 
facto merger or consolidation, 3) the acquirer is a continuation of the seller, or 4) transaction 
is fraudulent entered into with the aim to evade liabilities.
22
 
The first exception applies when the parties to the transaction agree on the allocation of 
liability themselves, concluding an agreement specifying what party shall take responsibility 
for a specific liability.
23
 So, the parties are free to negotiate and agree on the allocation of 
liabilities, reflecting the result of negotiations in the price for the acquisition.  
The second exception arises, when the court establishes that, despite the transaction being 
structured as an asset purchase deal, what in fact took place was a consolidation or merger. 
Originally, this exception developed with the purpose of safeguarding dissenter’s rights of 
shareholders, i.e. right of shareholders provided under certain jurisdictions to receive payment 
for the fair value of their shares, in case of merger (other major decisions) with which the 
shareholders do not agree. Lately, however, this exception was mainly used to protect 
creditors, in particular unsecured creditors, from their debtors trying to evade liability. The 
USA court has established the following elements indicating that transfer of assets amounts to 
de facto merger. First element is continuation of the enterprise of the seller, i.e. a continuity of 
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 Supra note 5, pp. 7-8. 
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 Ibid, p. 8. 
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management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations. Second 
element of de facto merger is a continuity of shareholders that may be the result of the price 
for the acquired assets being the shares of the acquirer’s company. Third element is stop in the 
operation of seller’s business and subsequent liquidation or dissolution. The fourth element 
indicating de facto merger is acquirer taking over those obligations of the seller that are 
required for the uninterrupted continuation of business operations of the seller.
24
  
In this context noteworthy is Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles case that arose in the context of 
foreclosure sale. In this case, an unsecured creditor filed a claim seeking to recover trade debt 
from the defendant that was not its de facto debtor, but was established with the aim of 
bidding at the foreclosure sale and subsequently acquired the majority of its debtor’s assets. 
Unsecured creditor claimed that the defendant was the corporate successor to its initial debtor. 
The defendant argued against imposing successor liability pointing out that predecessor 
company had not been liquidated and continued to exist. Also, the predecessor did not sell all 
of its assets and continued to own certain ones, including real estate. The court disregarded 
this argument claiming it to be form over substance. However, the defendant also claimed that 
transaction did not harm unsecured creditors as secured debt exceeded the collateral and the 
secured creditor had the right to foreclose. The court recognized the right of the secured 
creditor to foreclose and admitted that if assets had been transferred to unrelated third party, 
the unsecured creditor would not have an opportunity to recover the debt. However, 
considering the circumstances in that case the court acknowledged the de facto merger and 
imposed successor liability on the defendant, because the transaction was a «reconstituted 
version of itself (...) in an effort to retain its textile business as a going concern with the 
potential for future profits, while shedding its debt obligations to unsecured creditors».25 
Another similar case, where the court imposed successor liability on the acquirer is 
Renaissance Worldwide Inc. v. Converged Access Inc. case. In that case, the purpose of the 
transaction was to continue business operation without any interruptions and simultaneously 
avoid liability to unsecured creditors. All of the assets, including intellectual property and 
other intangibles, and business operations were transferred to a new company with the same 
owners, management, and business operation.
26
 
Another exception to the general rule of non-liability takes place, when the purchasing 
company is merely a continuation of the selling company. While this exception is similar to 
previously discussed one of de facto merger, this exception focus more on continuity of 
ownership or corporate structure, as opposed to the continuation of the business operation.  
Main signs indicating the continuation are the following: the buyer's use of the seller's name, 
location, employees, a common identity of shareholders and directors, existence of only one 
company after the transfer of assets.
27
 What is encompassed under this exception, in fact, 
seems to be quite similar to what is understood under the definition of «transfer of an 
undertaking» in Latvia. 
Lastly, the forth main exception to the rule of non-liability is fraudulent transfers, i.e. 
transaction concluded with the aim to defraud. While recently in the USA some more 
exception to the rule of non-liability emerged, they are not recognized by all the courts, as 
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opposed to four traditional exceptions discussed above.
28
 One such recently developed 
exception is continuity of enterprise. In contrast to de facto merger or mere continuity 
exceptions, this one does not require continuity of owners or corporate structure or assets 
being acquired for shares. What it focuses on is, whether there is continuity of the seller’s 
business and whether seller stops its business operations.
29
 
To sum up, this Section demonstrated that in the USA the general rule of the non-liability of 
the buyer for the debt of the seller is subject to numerous exceptions. One of these exceptions, 
namely, an exception that arises if the acquirer is a continuation of the seller, is quite similar 
to what is understood as «transfer of an undertaking» in Latvia. While this Section has 
established the existence of liability rule in case of a transfer of assets in another legal system, 
the next Section will try to determine the purpose of such legal rules. 
1.3. The purpose of the liability rule in case of a transfer of an undertaking 
In accordance with the Commentary to the Commercial Law of Latvia, the purpose of 
Article 20 is the protection of the rights of third persons. It establishes the indivisibility of 
obligations contained in the undertaking from the rights.
30
 
The main risk that third persons – creditors face in respect of a transfer of an undertaking is 
the possibility that the debtor alienates belonging to him undertaking, from which he was 
supposed to get revenue. The revenue, in turn, was supposed to be used to settle debtor’s debt 
to the creditor. Therefore, Article 20 aims to protect the creditors. Firstly, it protects the 
creditors by ensuring that the creditors have right to claim in respect of the acquirer, which 
basically means that the debt follows the undertaking. Secondly, Article 20 ensures that for 
the period of time the creditor also retains right to claim in respect of the transferor also.
31
 In 
respect of liabilities, which originated before the transfer of the undertaking and are to be 
fulfilled in the five year period after the transfer, Article 20 ensures that the creditors do not 
need to look for the acquirer of the undertaking in order to receive performance of the 
obligation. They have an option to choose from whom to receive satisfaction.
32
 
Yedidia Z. Stern, when discussing possible adverse effects that acquisitions may have on 
creditors, also claims that acquisitions may have an adverse effect on the main interest of the 
creditors – the interest to redeem the debt. Firstly, the acquisition may result in the change in 
the degree of leverage of the companies involved in transaction. Secondly, the main activity 
of the companies involved in the acquisition deal may also change as well as associated risk 
levels. As an illustration imagine that there is a loan agreement between the company and the 
creditor. Interest rate is set low due to conservative, i.e. low risk nature of the company. This 
company (an undertaking) gets acquired by much more speculative, risk-taking company. 
Consequently, this acquisition has adverse effect on the possibility of the creditor to redeem 
his debt. Similarly, creditors are adversely effected, if the debtor company (an undertaking), 
which itself has only few debts, gets acquired by the company with numerous debts. In this 
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case, the significant increase in total debt of the debtor company reduces the chances of the 
creditors to redeem their individual debts.
33
 
Article 20 containing a provisions aiming to ensure that creditors are able to receive 
performance of their debts, is the result of the development of the commercial law over the 
last centuries. The contract law has developed from nexum institute in Roman law, which 
involved complete subjection of the debtor to the creditor in case if an obligation was not 
fulfilled, to prohibition to imprison for failure to pay. For centuries, debtors were personally 
liable for non-payment. In accordance with that approach, the principal object of liability was 
the debtor himself, but assets that creditors could use were those belonging to the debtor when 
obligation was being fulfilled.
34
 Only the most progressive legal systems had mechanisms, 
whose purpose was to ensure legal protection against fraudulent transfers of assets intended to 
defraud creditors (in fraudem creditorum), e.g. Actio Pauliana.
35
 So, for centuries obligations 
could not follow the property in cases other than inheritance (mortis causa institute in Roman 
law). Only relatively recently, an undertaking was acknowledged as a legal entity. Due to this 
recognition, Germany being the first implemented the concept of non-personal commitment 
of the debtor in German Commercial Act adopted in 1897. At the time, Germany introduced 
this concept mainly to strengthen the confidence in a company. Later, other states, following 
Germany’s example, introduced similar concepts in their own legal systems.36 
However, while in case of an asset purchase deal creditors certainly need to be considered, 
their interests are not the only ones in need of protection. For example, Ilaria Pretelli, when 
analyzing Actio Pauliana as a technique aimed at protecting creditors in cases when the 
debtor transfers his assets in order to avoid paying his debts, admits the existence of 
conflicting interests that need to be balanced. She indicates that there is not only a need to 
protect investment (creditors), but also a need to protect legal certainty and the freedom of 
contract.
37
   
Similarly, John H. Matheson claims that the basis for non-liability principle is a need to 
ensure the free alienability of corporate assets. Non-liability principle, in turn, includes two 
other independent principles. Firstly, a need to protect the buyer from liabilities of the 
predecessor that were not expressly assumed
38
 and, secondly, a need to promote predictability 
in corporate transactions.
39
 
In turn, Sharon L. Cloud, when claiming that corporations planning business expansion 
require the law of successor liability to be predictable, explains that: 
[f]acing potentially unlimited and unpredictable exposure for future products liability 
claims which they had no part in creating forces companies interested in acquisitions 
to reconsider. Corporations for sale face a correspondingly shrinking market. In purely 
economic terms, the free flow of assets to their most efficient uses is severely 
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impaired if there is no way to know at the outset how much an acquisition will truly 
cost.
40
 
So, in case of an asset purchase deal there are not only creditors that need to be protected. 
There are other interests in need of protection as well, inter alia, legal certainty and the 
freedom of contract. However, Ilaria Pretelli admits that to a certain extent, the freedom (of 
contract) as well as confidence in the certainty of legal transactions must be sacrificed in order 
to protect the rights of creditors. However, each national legal system determines the balance 
between protection of opposing interests itself.
41
 It is not possible to achieve simultaneous 
equal protection of competing interests. The states need to find balance between safeguarding 
competing interests. The question is whether legal norms implemented in national legal 
systems are truly balanced, whether they do not unjustly sacrifice certain interests in the name 
of protecting other interests. 
This Section established that the purpose of Article 20 was the protection of the rights of third 
persons – creditors. The main risk that creditors face in case of a transfer of an undertaking is 
that their chances of redeeming the debt will be undermined. The most progressive legal 
systems had mechanisms for protection of creditors against fraudulent transfers of assets (in 
fraudem creditorum) already in the deep past. However, this Section established the existence 
of other competing interests that needed to be protected in case of an asset purchase deal as 
well. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, Article 20 illustrates one of the complications that arise if an asset purchase deal 
takes a form of a transfer of an undertaking. In particular, Article 20 establishes liability rule 
in case of a transfer of an undertaking, from which no derogation is allowed. It clearly limits 
freedom of contract of the transferor and the acquirer of an undertaking as even if they 
conclude a contract establishing different liability scheme, it is void as to third parties. The 
purpose of such limitation is the protection of the rights of third persons – creditors. In the 
absence of this provision, in case of a transfer of an undertaking creditors’ chances of 
redeeming the debt would be undermined. Without doubt, protection of creditors is a 
legitimate goal. However, does protection of creditors in this case justify sacrificing 
protection of other values by limiting one of the fundamental principles of contract law – 
freedom of contract principle? In order to answer this question, in the following Chapters the 
Thesis proceeds to explore freedom of contract principle and its scope. 
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2. UNDERSTANDING FREEDOM OF CONTRACT PRINCIPLE 
2.1. Defining freedom of contract principle 
While seemingly a simple task, defining freedom of contract principle might be a challenge. 
When talking about freedom of contract P. S. Atiyah says that: «it is by no means easy to say 
what exactly the nineteenth-century judges meant, when they used this phrase».42 
Nevertheless, P. S. Atiyah affirms that at least it might be said that freedom of contract 
embodies two interlinked, but still distinct concepts. The first concept is that contracts are 
based on mutual agreements. In turn, the second concept is that contracts are formed based on 
free choice, unlimited by external control such as governmental or legislative interference.
43
  
This explanation of the freedom of contract principle is in line with the definition provided in 
Black’s Law Dictionary. Black’s Law Dictionary defines freedom of contract as: 
the doctrine that people have the right to bind themselves legally, a judicial concept 
that contracts are based on mutual agreements and free choice, and thus should not be 
hampered by external control such as governmental interference. This is the principle 
that people are able to fashion their relations by private agreements, especially as 
opposed to the assigned roles of the feudal system.
44
 
This is a brief formal definition of the freedom of contract principle. However, this definition 
does not explain what exactly freedom of contract principle is and how it manifests. In order 
to understand it, scholarly opinions must be analyzed. 
K. Balodis claims that freedom of contact principle is the most important expression of 
private autonomy. He says that freedom of contract principle is legal precondition for the 
existence of capitalist oriented economic system. In a free market, exchange of goods happens 
in accordance with supply and demand, where parties freely agree on the subject and price of 
an agreement.
45
 However, he also explains the necessity to limit absolute freedom of contract. 
He says that while parties to a civil agreement formally are equal under the law, in reality one 
party is often significantly financially or economically stronger than the other party. Thus, in 
circumstances of absolute freedom of contract, unequal material position of the parties would 
produce situations, where one party would be put under disproportionate pressure from the 
other party. Therefore, as K. Balodis explains, since the turn of 19
th
 and 20
th 
centuries 
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legislators of civilized states have gradually reformed the civil law, introducing laws aiming 
at the protection of the weaker parties of an agreement.
46
 
K. Torgāns, J. Kārkliņš and A. Bitāns also affirm that freedom of contract is an important 
element of market economy as well as an expression of private autonomy of the parties to a 
civil relationship. However, similarly as K. Balodis, they also argue against absolute freedom 
of contract. They compare freedom to a double edged knife as the way in which it is 
expressed may conflict with other fundamental concepts of civil relationships, especially with 
justice, good faith and equivalence. They say that freedom is not a personal concept only. 
Freedom is exercised in the society, where interests of other members of the society need to 
be also respected. K. Torgāns, J. Kārkliņš and A. Bitāns provide historical examples, when 
the conduct of individuals and groups of people, selfishly exercising their freedom, has 
resulted in social shocks and protests. As an example, they mention French Revolution, which 
started with the motto «Liberty, Equality, Fraternity», but in the end led to the civil war. 
Further, they state that Latvia also experienced both positive and negative expressions of 
freedom. Latvian people were of course happy, when Latvia swiftly moved to a free market 
economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, this almost absolute freedom 
rapidly resulted in battles for market share with guns and brute force and marketing of 
counterfeit and stolen goods. Further, during this time Latvia experienced the collapse of 
small and big banks, which resulted in the loss of citizens’ deposits. This has shown that to 
some extent the state needs to interfere in order to regulate so-called free market.
47
 
Concluding, K. Torgāns, J. Kārkliņš and A. Bitāns affirm that freedom of contract principle 
and recognition of this principle in the laws is much more beneficial to the society than 
administrative regulation (Soviet type economic planning) or control and regulation systems 
existing in totalitarian states. However, they again emphasize that freedom also obligates to 
have due regard to the interests of the society in general. Therefore, according to them, state 
can interfere and limit freedom of contract on the following grounds. 1) Performance of state 
social functions (prohibition of agreements compromising social order, environment, health 
and security of people. 2) Prohibition of agreements contrary to the law and good virtues. 
3) Protection of the weaker party against unjust, unfair provisions of the agreement. 
4) Generation of possibilities to adjust the agreement to new circumstances if they have 
significantly changed.
48
 
Further, widely accepted limitation on the freedom of contract principle arises out of respect 
for the freedom and rights of non-consenting third parties. The majority of contracts have 
twofold nature. They create two types of effects. Firstly, they bind parties to the contract, i.e. 
impose certain contractual obligations upon the parties. Secondly, contracts affect pre-existing 
legal order, thus affecting third persons. This way unlimited freedom of contract can infringe 
on the rights of the third parties, who have not agreed to be bound by any contract.  So, in 
order to preserve the rights of third parties, states put limits to absolute freedom of contract. 
At the same time, the majority of states do not have provisions in their legal acts, stipulating 
that parties to the contract are forbidden from undermining the rights of third parties. This is 
so, because the basis for safeguarding the rights of third parties is a fundamental principle 
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accepted by all legal systems – no one can harm another. However, while possibly not having 
such provision, each state has its own methods for ensuring protection of the rights of third 
parties to the contract.
49 
Latvia, in particular, also has provisions safeguarding rights of non-
consenting third parties. One vivid example of such provision is found in previously 
considered Article 20.   
So, while freedom of contract is a significant concept, it still needs to be limited in the interest 
of the whole society, as some agreements may compromise its safety and order.
50
 B. Blum 
expresses similar opinion. He says that while freedom of contract is a fundamental value – a 
component of person’s freedom, there are also other values in need of protection. Therefore, 
there must be limits, such as prohibition of criminal companies, provisions for the protection 
of environment as well as prevention of unfair competition.
51
  
H. N. Scheiber similarly as B. Blum considers freedom of contact as a fundamental right, 
which is often celebrated as the primary reason for the establishment of functional, market-
based economy.
52
 Further, H. N. Scheiber claims that: 
[t]he institution of contract has become in modern society the principal instrument for 
organizing the private marketplace; indeed, it is coextensive with the market in its 
scope.
53
  
D. P. Weber also confirms that freedom of contract principle is a fundamental right 
deserving of additional protection, however not an all-encompassing right.
54 
 
H. G. Hutchison, on the other hand, has more radical opinion in relation to the freedom of 
contract principle. He claims that for freedom of contract principle to become a meaningful 
concept, citizens, politicians, and judges must demonstrate modesty in relation to the ability 
of a state to solve the human problem and immodesty in relation to an individual’s right and 
responsibility to solve his own problems through negotiations with others.
55
 
On the other hand, B. Fauvarque-Cosson and D. Mazeaud similarly as H. N. Scheiber, 
B. Blum and D. P. Weber, while stating that freedom of contract undeniably is a fundamental 
principle of contract law, emphasize that it is limited by mandatory rules. Freedom of contract 
principle does not authorize the parties to the contract to violate mandatory rules. This 
principle is to be exercised only within the framework of respect for mandatory rules.
56
 
This Section attempted to define freedom of contract principle and outline its scope. Pursuant 
to Black’s Law Dictionary freedom of contract is a concept according to which contracts are 
based on mutual agreements and free choice and should not be hampered by external control. 
It was demonstrated that among scholars, there was a wide consensus that freedom of contract 
was an important element of market economy as well as an expression of private autonomy. 
Further, pursuant to various scholars, freedom of contact is the fundamental right. However, 
while, scholars agree on the importance of freedom of contract, they also agree that freedom 
of contract is not an absolute right. This Section listed grounds, on which freedom of contract 
                                                          
 
49
 Fauvarque-Cosson and Mazeaud, European Contract Law: Materials for a Common Frame of Reference: 
Terminology, Guiding Principles, Model Rules, p. 438; 443. 
50
 Supra note 47, p. 65. 
51
 Blum, Contracts: Examples & Explanations, p. 1. 
52
 Scheiber, The state and freedom of contract, p. 3. 
53
 Supra note 52, p. 3. 
54
 Weber, «Restricting the Freedom of Contract: A Fundamental Prohibition», p. 54. 
55
 Hutchison, «Lochner, Liberty Of Contract, and Paternalism: Revising the Revisionists?», p. 465. 
56
 Supra note 49, p. 423. 
19 
could be limited. One such ground is the protection of the rights of third persons. Exactly this 
reason is used to justify limitation put on freedom of contract principle set in Article 20. 
Having defined freedom of contract principle and having outlined its scope in this Section, the 
Thesis moves to the analysis of the way freedom of contract principle manifests in 
contemporary legal framework as well as how it coexists with limitations put on this 
principle. 
2.2. Contemporary legal framework – absolute freedom of contract? 
After introducing freedom of contract principle as well as its limits in the previous Section, 
the Thesis proceeds to outline the ways freedom of contract principle and its limits are 
expressed in contemporary legal framework, both in Latvian law and in European Contract 
Law. 
2.2.1. Freedom of contract principle and its limits in Latvia 
It can be claimed that freedom of contract principle, namely, that parties freely decide who 
with whom enters into agreement and on what terms, in Latvia arises from Article 1511 of the 
Civil Law of Latvia. This Article says that:  
[a] contract within the widest meaning of the word is any mutual agreement between 
two or more persons on entering into, altering, or ending lawful relations. A contract 
in the narrower sense applied here is a mutual expression of intent made by two or 
more persons based on an agreement, with the purpose of establishing obligations 
rights.
57
  
Other than that, in the Civil Law of Latvia there is no Article that would explicitly proclaim 
freedom of contract principle. Rather, freedom of contract principle and its limits arise from 
the whole set of norms found in the Civil Law of Latvia, which on the one hand,  proclaim 
freedom of contract principle in all four its manifestations, but on the other hand, set limits to 
this principle.
58
 
In Latvia freedom of contract principle has four manifestations. Firstly, there is freedom to 
conclude an agreement, meaning that each person can freely choose whether to conclude an 
agreement or not. Secondly, there is freedom to choose partner to an agreement, which means 
freedom to choose with whom to enter into an agreement. Third manifestation is freedom to 
choose the content of an agreement. Lastly, there is freedom to choose form of an agreement, 
e.g. oral, written, notarial.
59
  
It is exactly one of these manifestations of freedom of contract principle that Article 20 limits. 
While Article 20 does not have any effect on person’s freedom to conclude an agreement, 
choose partner to an agreement or choose form of an agreement, Article 20 limits person’s 
freedom to choose the content of an agreement. This Article expressly allocates liability in 
case of a transfer of an undertaking. While the acquirer and the transferor of an undertaking 
are not prohibited from agreeing on different allocation of liability, such agreement is void as 
to third parties. So, while Article 20 allows the acquirer and the transferor to conclude an 
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agreement allocating liability in case of a transfer of an undertaking, it prohibits them from 
including in the agreement provision making such agreement binding for third parties, thus 
limiting freedom to choose the content of an agreement. This limitation means that if the 
transferor and the acquirer conclude an agreement releasing the acquirer from the liability for 
obligations that arose before transfer of an undertaking, the creditor can still choose to ask for 
satisfaction from the acquirer. In such a case, the acquirer cannot object on the basis of the 
agreement concluded with the transferor. The acquirer is obligated to fulfill the obligation in 
accordance with the law. Of course, in such a case, after the acquirer fulfills an obligation to 
the creditor, he can raise a claim to recover the respective amount from the transferor on the 
basis of concluded agreement. However, as must be emphasized, the acquirer may do so only 
after he settles the debt to the creditor. This means that he has to pay the funds that he could 
otherwise invest somewhere, so they could bring him interest, or use it for the expansions of 
his business, or use it for any other purpose. In turn, recovering paid amount from the 
transferor may result in lengthy court proceedings, or in fact funds may not be recovered at all 
(for example, if the transferor is declared bankrupt). 
Continuing the discussion on freedom of contract principle, it must be also emphasized that 
freedom of contract is a fundamental value – a component of person’s freedom. While the 
Constitution of Latvia does not explicitly mention freedom of contract, it contains various 
Articles protecting various freedoms, for example, freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, freedom of expression, freedom of previously announced peaceful meetings, street 
processions, pickets, freedom of trade unions, freedom of scientific research, artistic and other 
creative activity.
60
 
However, while Latvian normative acts recognize freedom of contract principle and its four 
manifestations, even if in some cases implicitly, they also put limits on it.  
For example, freedom to choose the content of an agreement exists so far it is not limited by 
imperative legal norms.
61
 Article 1415 of the Civil Law of Latvia illustrates this approach. It 
provides general limit to the freedom to choose the content of an agreement. It states that: 
[a]n impermissible or indecent action, the purpose of which is contrary to religion, 
laws or moral principles, or which is intended to circumvent the law, may not be the 
subject-matter of a lawful transaction; such a transaction is void.
62
  
Further, there are numerous laws limiting freedom to choose the content of an agreement in 
such legal areas, where stronger party due to its position has the power to dictate conditions 
that adversely affect weaker parties. For example, many such provisions aim to protect 
employees and consumers.
63
 There is Latvian Unfair Commercial Practices Prohibition Law, 
whose aim is to protect consumer rights and economic interests. Consumer Rights Protection 
Law also has similar agenda.
 64
  
Furthermore, many provisions limiting freedom of contract principle are found in Latvian 
Competition law. Their primary aim is to ensure that influential legal entities do not abuse 
their position in the market and limit competition as lack of competition would result in lower 
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product offering, higher prices and it would be more difficult for new members to enter the 
market.
65
 There are also other laws limiting freedom of contract principle. For example, 
Freedom to Provide Services Law, Law On Extrajudicial Recovery of Debt, Public 
Procurement Law, Credit Institution Law, etc.
66
 
In property law, freedom to choose content of the agreement is mostly limited in order to 
protect interests of third persons. This is because property rights are absolute rights that are in 
force for any third person and in case of necessity can be used in respect of any third person.
67
 
To conclude, freedom of contract principle has a clear presence in Latvian normative acts. 
This principle and its four manifestations are recognized in the Civil Law of Latvia. Further, it 
can be argued that in Latvia freedom of contract principle indirectly exists also as a 
component of fundamental right to freedom. However, in line with previous discussion on 
freedom of contract principle, while Latvian normative acts recognize this principle, the same 
acts also establish limitations on this principle.  
2.2.2. Freedom of contract principle and its limits in the European Contract Law 
Previous Section considered the way freedom of contract principle and its limits were 
expressed in Latvia. In turn, this Section analyses how freedom of contract principle is 
expressed in European Contract Law. 
However, before considering European Contract Law, firstly, it must be clarified what is 
encompassed under this term. European Contract Law has two main directions. Firstly, 
European Contract Law is codified in secondary legislation of the European Union 
(hereinafter – the EU), which consists of international conventions, agreements and EU legal 
acts. EU legal acts in turn consist of five types of legal acts, i.e. regulations, directives, 
decisions, recommendations and opinions, which depending on their nature can have a 
binding force. Secondly, European Contract Law consists of academic documents, such as 
previously mentioned UNIDROIT Principles, the Principles Of European Contract Law 
(hereinafter – the PECL), European Code of Contract – Preliminary Draft etc. While the 
majority of these academic documents lack legal force and cannot be used as a source of law, 
they were drafted by highly authoritative academics, whose primary aim was the 
harmonization of national laws of the EU states and they give insight into dominant, even 
prevailing concepts.
68
  
When talking about secondary legislation of the EU, in particular, conventions, it must be 
noted, that the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(hereinafter – the CISG) does not explicitly proclaim freedom of contract principle. However, 
Article 6 of the CISG provides for the right of the parties to exclude the application of the 
CISG, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions. UNCITRAL Secretariat’s 
explanatory note on the CISG recognized this Article as a proclamation of the fundamental 
principle of freedom of contract.
69
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Further, freedom of contract principle is recognized in almost all previously listed significant 
academic documents that constitute part of the European Contract Law. 
This principle is codified in current version of the PECL. Article 1:102 of the PECL states 
that: 
[p]arties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its content, subject to the 
requirements of good faith and fair dealing, and the mandatory rules established by 
these Principles.
70
 
However, while the PECL explicitly recognizes freedom of contract principle, it still limits its 
scope by mandatory rules. While Article 1:103 of the PECL permits parties to avoid 
application of national laws, as it allows parties to choose to have their contract governed by 
the PECL with the effect that national rules are not applicable, derogation from mandatory 
rules is not allowed under any circumstances. Mandatory rules of national, supranational and 
international law, which are applicable according to the relevant rules of private international 
law, need to be complied with irrespective of the law governing the contract.
71
 As stated in 
the commentary to the PECL, these mandatory rules from which no derogation is permitted, 
are rules which  
are expressive of a fundamental public policy of the enacting country and to which 
effect should be given when the contract has a close connection to this country.
72
  
To sum up, while the PECL seemingly provides an opportunity to elude the application of 
certain national rules, mandatory rules that are applicable regardless, still limit freedom of 
contract principle. 
The same approach towards freedom of contract principle is taken in the European Code of 
Contract – Preliminary Draft. Article 2&1 of the European Code of Contract – Preliminary 
Draft explicitly proclaims this principle by stating that: «[t]he parties can freely determine the 
contents of the contract».73  
However, at the same time, it specifies that this principle is to be understood  
within the limits imposed by mandatory rules, morals and public policy, as established 
in the present code, Community law or national laws of the Member States of the 
European Union, provided always that the parties thereby do not solely aim to harm 
others. 
If this is not observed, in accordance with Article 140 of the European Code of Contract 
Preliminary Draft the contract is considered to be null.
74
 
Similar approach is taken in UNIDROIT Principles. Article 1.1 of UNIDROIT Principles 
states that: «[t]he parties are free to enter into a contract and to determine its content».75 
Further, the commentary to this Article adds that principle of freedom of contract, which 
entails the right of people to freely choose the parties to the transaction and the right to freely 
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choose the terms of transaction (the content of the agreement) is the basis of «an open, 
market-oriented and competitive international economic order».76 
However, even having acknowledged the significance of the freedom of contract principle, 
UNIDROIT Principles limit it by mandatory rules. Article 1.4 of UNIDROIT Principles 
affirm that mandatory rules, whether of national, international or supranational origin, prevail, 
and nothing can restrict their application.
77
 
Having established, that freedom of contract principle is recognized also on the European 
level, it must be considered, what expressions of freedom of contract are recognized. 
Similarly, as Latvian normative acts, European Contract Law also recognizes that freedom of 
contract principle can take different forms. Firstly, there is the right to freely choose the party 
to the contract, i.e. with whom to enter into the contract. The Commentary to Article 1.1 of 
UNIDROIT Principles recognizes  
the right of business people to decide freely to whom they will offer their goods or 
services and by whom they wish to be supplied.
78
 
Secondly, UNIDROIT Principles also recognize the right to choose the form of the contract, 
e.g. written, oral, notarial. This right is found in Article 1.2 of UNIDROIT Principles. 
According to this Article, no special form of contract is required. The existence of the contract 
may be confirmed by any means available, including witnesses.
79
 Similar provision can be 
found also in Article 1127 of the Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law 
of Prescription. This Article states that: 
[a]s a general rule, contracts are completely formed by the mere consent of the parties 
regardless of the form in which this may be expressed.
80
 
Thirdly, there is the right to choose the content of the contract. This right is established in 
Article 2&1 of the European Code of Contract Preliminary Draft.
81
 Similarly, this right is 
explicitly recognized in Article 1:102 of the PECL
82
 and Article 1.1 of UNIDROIT 
Principles.
83
 
These three listed manifestations of freedom of contract principle are analogous to the ones 
found in Latvian legal acts. However, the European Contract Law recognizes one more 
manifestation not explicitly recognized in Latvian legislature. It is the right to freely negotiate 
and to break off negotiations.
84
 This right is included in the first sentence of article 1104 of 
the Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription, which states 
that: «[t]he parties are free to begin, continue and break off negotiations».85 UNIDROIT 
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Principles also have similar provision, i.e. Article 2.1.15 states that: «[a] party is free to 
negotiate and is not liable for failure to reach an agreement».86 
So, as has been outlined, the European Contract law explicitly recognizes freedom of contract 
principle and its expressions. Further, not only European Contract Law explicitly recognizes 
it. All EU member states have acknowledged freedom of contract principle, in particular, 
freedom to choose the content of the contract.
87
 The majority of the states have included it in 
their laws, e.g. this principle is found in legal acts of Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, 
Belgium and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria.
88
 However, while all EU member states 
recognize freedom of contract principle, they all also acknowledge that freedom of contract 
principle operates within the framework of respect for mandatory rules. For example, under 
Article 1322 of the Italian Civil Code freedom of contract principle operates «within the 
limits laid down by the law». Similarly, Article 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code while 
proclaiming freedom of contract principle, stipulates that: «contracts cannot be contrary to 
statute, to morality or to public policy (…) ».89 
In some EU member states, freedom of contract principle, while being acknowledged as a 
fundamental principle, is not explicitly included in legal acts. For example, in Switzerland 
there is no national rule that explicitly proclaims freedom of contract principle. However, this 
principle is unanimously recognized as one of four fundamental freedoms on which Swiss 
civil law rests.
90
  
To sum up, this Section of the Thesis established that similarly as in Latvian normative acts, 
freedom of contract and its various expressions were recognized also under the European 
Contract Law as well as in various normative acts of EU member states. However, this 
Section again confirmed that there was no absolute freedom of contract. All considered legal 
acts, while acknowledging freedom of contract, also specified that it was subject to inter alia 
mandatory rules. Having once again confirmed that there was no absolute freedom of contract 
and that it was subject to various restrictions, in next Section the Thesis proceeds to analyze 
whether the European Contract Law contains limitations on freedom of contract set for the 
protection of third parties. In particular, the next Section attempts to answer whether 
protection of rights of third persons – creditors, similarly as in Latvia, justifies limiting 
freedom of contract principle under European Contract Law. 
2.2.3. The limitation on freedom of contract for the protection of third parties 
This Section attempts to answer whether protection of rights of third persons, in particular, 
creditors, similarly as in Latvia, justifies limiting freedom of contract principle under 
European Contract Law. 
Firstly, it must be noted, that general provisions safeguarding third parties from relative effect 
of the contract are present in numerous legal documents. For example, Article 1165 of the 
Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription states that: 
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[c]ontracts bind only the contracting parties: they have no effect on third parties 
except in the situations and subject to the limitations explained below.
91
  
Similarly, the European Code of Contract Preliminary Draft contains provision that limits 
freedom of contract for the protection of third party rights. Article 2&1 states that parties are 
free to choose the content of the contract inter alia if they do not aim to harm others with this 
contract.
92
 
Secondly, certain legal documents include provisions intended specifically for the protection 
of creditors. The Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription 
emphasize that there is a difference between «third parties, who are entirely foreign to the 
contract» and «third party creditors». One of the protective measures available to creditors 
under this legal document is the possibility to challenge any legal act made by the debtor with 
the intention to defraud the creditor. In particular, Article 1167 states that: «a creditor can 
challenge in his own name any judicial act made by his debtor in fraud of his rights».93 
Further, the Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription 
expressly state that if the court declares the act fraudulent, it does not have an effect on the 
creditors, so the creditors are not prejudiced by it or its consequences.
94
  
The European Code of Contract Preliminary Draft similarly as the Proposals for Reform of 
the Law of Obligations and the Law of Prescription have provision specifically intended for 
the protection of creditors against fraud. In accordance with Article 154, contracts drafted 
with the intent to defraud a creditor of one of the parties are not opposable to third parties 
(creditors).
95
  
Further, provisions safeguarding creditors from fraud are found also in normative acts of 
various EU member states. For example, such are found in the French Civil Code (fraude 
paulienne). Article 1167 states that creditors: «may also, on their own behalf, attack 
transactions made by their debtor in fraud of their rights».96 
Similarly, Italian law also has protective measures against fraudulent acts. Articles 2901 to 
2904 of the Civil Code regulate action révocatoire in case of fraudulent acts. Similar 
provisions are present also in Dutch law, Spanish law, Belgian law et al.
97
 
This Section established that the European Contract Law also contained provisions limiting 
freedom of contract principle for the protection of third parties. Further, both European 
Contract Law and normative acts of EU member states include provisions safeguarding 
creditor rights. So, it means that protection of creditor rights justifies limitations being put on 
freedom of contract principle not only under Latvian normative acts, but also under European 
Contract Law and laws of various EU member states.  
Conclusion 
To sum up, freedom of contract is an important element of market economy as well as an 
expression of private autonomy and a great benefit to society. Furthermore, in accordance 
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with various scholars freedom of contract is an element of a fundamental right. However, 
while, scholars agree on the importance of freedom of contract, they also agree that freedom 
of contract is not an absolute right. Chapter 2 listed various grounds, that could justify 
limiting the scope of the freedom of contract. One such ground is the protection of the rights 
of third persons. Exactly this reason is used to justify limitation put on freedom of contract 
principle set in Article 20. Having defined freedom of contract principle and having outlined 
its scope, Chapter 2 proceeded to analyze the way freedom of contract principle was 
expressed in contemporary legal framework. It was found, that freedom of contract principle 
was recognized both under Latvian normative acts as well as under European Contract Law 
and normative acts of various EU member states. However, this Chapter also confirmed that 
currently there was no absolute freedom of contract. All considered legal acts, while 
acknowledging freedom of contract, also specified that it was subject to various restrictions. 
So, more than a century after they were said, words of Chief Justice Charles Hughes that 
«freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right»98 still ring true. Lastly, 
Chapter 2 established that European Contract Law similarly as Latvian normative acts 
contained provisions limiting freedom of contract principle for the protection of third parties. 
Both European Contract Law and normative acts of EU member states have provisions, 
whose purpose, similarly as the purpose of Article 20, is safeguarding of creditor rights. 
Having outlined the contemporary legal framework, where freedom of contract principle and 
its limitations operate, in order to better understand freedom of contract principle, in Chapter 
3 the Thesis continues the discussion on the freedom of contract principle, tracing the 
development of this principle through ages.  
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3. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT PRINCIPLE THROUGH AGES 
3.1. Origins and philosophical underpinnings of the freedom of contract 
principle 
Origins of the freedom of contract principle can be traced to the classical period, i.e. the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This era brought the development of philosophical 
movement known as liberalism. Liberalism, in turn, influenced the development of the theory 
of natural rights and individual freedom. Individual freedom and restriction of governmental 
interference in private sector with the aim to allow greater freedom of individuals were some 
of the main concepts of the era. These notions were greatly supported by great political 
economist Adam Smith, social philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, and Thomas Jefferson, and 
great judicial thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf.
99
 Among these theories, 
freedom of contract principle developed. 
Development of freedom of contract principle was greatly influenced by social philosopher 
John Locke with his philosophy of natural law. Pursuant to him: 
the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be 
under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his 
rule.
100
 
John Locke’s philosophy was based on the notion that people have natural rights derived from 
the law of nature such as rights to life, liberty, and estate and the objective of the government 
has to be the protection of these natural rights. 
Adam Smith also greatly influenced the development of freedom of contract principle. 
Freedom of contract principle with its antipathy towards governmental interference with the 
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rights of individuals to freely negotiate and enter into agreements of their choice is very well 
illustrated by his words: 
[e]very man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to 
pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into 
competition with those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely 
discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be 
exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human 
wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry 
of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the 
interest of the society.
101
 
This approach towards freedom of contract principle is in line with laissez-faire doctrine
102
, 
which Adam Smith was the progenitor of. Laissez-faire doctrine advocates minimum 
governmental intervention. At the basis of it is the claim that perfect freedom of exchange is 
advantageous for everyone in the society, because in this case no one is obliged to exchange 
something that he wants more for what he wants less. According to laissez-faire doctrine 
market itself resolves its problems without any outside intervention being required. Laissez-
faire doctrine operates under the assumption that parties know their own interests and have 
the power to defend them and outside forces should not prevent them from doing so.
103
 
Both Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill argued that the right of individuals to freely bargain 
with each other was a vital precondition for the progress of society. Further, they even 
claimed that free enterprise and freedom of contract principle was an answer to society's 
industrial and social challenges.
104
 
So, as can be seen, the meaning of freedom of contract principle in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries significantly differed from what is understood as freedom of contract 
principle currently. As was discussed in Chapter 2, currently legal scholars understand 
freedom of contract as fundamental, but not an absolute right. On the other hand, John Locke 
and Adam Smith advocated almost absolute freedom of contract. However, what is 
noteworthy is that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, despite wide support for 
absolute freedom of contract, theory of natural rights, and laissez-faire doctrine, some 
scholars still argued that the government should be allowed to interfere in private matters, in 
order to keep people from harming other people. 
Noteworthy that such an opinion was expressed by advocate of the freedom of contract 
principle John Stuart Mill, who supported the notion of minimal governmental interference. 
He claimed that the only exception, when government should be allowed to interfere in 
private matters, is to keep people from harming other people. According to him, people 
should be allowed to freely enter into agreements of their choice as long as the objective of 
the agreement is not to harm others, it involves persons of full age and does not involve 
coercion, fraud, or deceit. One of the arguments used by John Stuart Mill against 
governmental interference is that according to him «when it does interfere, the odds are that it 
interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place».105 
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To sum up, this Section demonstrated that freedom of contract principle developed during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries among such concepts as liberalism, natural rights and 
laissez-faire doctrine. Freedom of contract principle was greatly supported by prominent 
political economists and great judicial thinkers. What is noteworthy, that even at that time, 
when absolute freedom of contract was widely supported, there were arguments coming from 
freedom of contract advocates themselves that limitations on freedom of contract were 
justified if intended to keep people from harming other people. Such approach is in line with 
contemporary legal framework. As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, European Contract Law 
has various provisions intended for the protection of third parties. Further, Article 20 also has 
the same aim. Having outlined origins and philosophical underpinnings of the freedom of 
contract principle in this Section, in the next Section the Thesis proceeds to follow the 
development of the freedom of contract principle, looking at the most vivid cases illustrating 
the development of this principle. 
3.2. Freedom of contract principle – what has history taught us? 
During the last centuries, the governments were experiencing the constant tension between the 
freedom of contract principle and the right of the government to restrict its scope. This tension 
was especially apparent in the context of labor rights. Interests of employers and the 
government (the society in general) in respect of worker protection and wage requirements 
constantly collided. 
Special attention deserve periods of time, when freedom of contract principle received the 
most support. Corresponding public policy of those times is very well illustrated by the 
judicial pronouncement that: 
[p]ublic policy requires it that men of full age and competent understanding shall have 
the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts ... shall be held sacred.
106
 
In this context the most prominent case, rightly considered the pinnacle of the freedom of 
contract principle is Lochner v. New York case, which started new era in the history of the 
USA – so-called Lochner Era.107 
3.2.1. The Lochner Era and its end 
In the USA, support for freedom of contract principle was at its strongest during so-called 
Lochner Era. Throughout Lochner Era, the USA courts proceeded to invalidate various legal 
acts, inter alia laws setting restrictions on minimum wage,
108
 maximum hour requirements,
109
 
union participation,
110
 federal child labor laws,
111
 and the mining industry
112
 based on the 
freedom of contract principle.  
So-called Lochner Era started in 1897 with the decision of the Supreme Court of the USA in 
Lochner v. New York case. This case is justly considered as the pinnacle of the freedom of 
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contract principle, illustrating absolute freedom from governmental interference. In this case, 
the Court invalidated a law limiting working hours of bakers to 60 as this law was considered 
to be in violation of freedom of contract principle.
113
 
In Lochner v. New York case the Court, assuming nearly equal bargaining power of the 
employer and the employee, found laws favoring one party (in this case the employee) 
anomalous.
114
 The Court claimed that the employees (bakers in that case) were in no sense 
wards of the state. The Court stated:  
[t]here is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person or the right of 
free contract (…) and there is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in 
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades (…) or that they are not able to assert 
their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the state, interfering 
with their independence of judgment and of action. They are in no sense wards of the 
state.
115
 
As follows from provided citation, the Supreme Court of the USA reached the decision to 
invalidate the law, inter alia in order to ensure the right of the employees to enter into 
contracts relying on their own judgement, even if contracts are disadvantageous. 
After the judgement in Lochner v. New York case a number of other similar judgements 
followed. The judgment in Lochner v. New York case started so called Lochner Era, lasting 
about thirty years. During Lochner Era the USA courts invalidated laws if they considered 
that these laws infringed on freedom of contract principle.  
In Adair v. United States, the Court by analogy with Lochner v. New York case declared 
unconstitutional laws prohibiting employees from entering into labor unions («yellow-dog» 
contracts). Similarly as in Lochner v. New York case, the Court claimed that: 
the employer and the employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs 
that equality is an arbitrary interference with liberty of contract which no government 
can legally justify in a free land.
116
 
Another Lochner Era case illustrating the rule of freedom of contract principle is Hammer v. 
Dagenhart case. In this case the Court evaluated the right of the Congress to enact legal act 
prohibiting the shipment of goods in interstate commerce produced in factories employing 
children. Evaluating the case on the basis of the harmless items doctrine, the Court stated that 
the Congress was allowed to enact legal acts banning the interstate shipment only of 
intrinsically harmful goods, e.g. immoral lottery tickets and impure food. However, according 
to the Court the Congress was not allowed to prohibit interstate shipment of goods that 
themselves were not harmful. The way the goods were produced was ruled to be irrelevant. 
So, considering that products of child labor in themselves were not harmful, the Court ruled 
that the Congress did not have the right to ban it from being the subject of interstate 
commerce. This meant that the freedom of contract principle was to be applied in all the cases 
in relation to free movement of goods with inherently harmful items being the exception.
117
 
This case demonstrates that during Lochner Era, protection of the rights of third persons, even 
children, did not have much weight, at least certainly not as much as it has now. In this case, 
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in the name of the freedom of contract, the Court failed to address protection of the rights of 
children, who could be adversely affected by invalidation of legal acts prohibiting the 
shipment of goods in interstate commerce produced in factories employing children. This case 
especially vividly demonstrates, to what extremes supporting unlimited freedom of contract 
can lead and cautions contemporary society to be very careful, when considering freedom of 
contract principle. 
The Lochner Era ended in 1937 with the decision of the Supreme Court of the USA in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish case, where the Court declared the establishment of minimum 
wages for women constitutionally legitimate. In this case, the Court considered the right of 
legislators to enact such law as a question of liberty rather than freedom of contract. The 
Court claimed that liberty was subject to legal restrains enforced to protect the health, safety, 
morals, and welfare of the people. Further, the Court added that the same principle applied 
also to freedom of contract principle.
118
 
In this case, the Court, opposing the decision in Lochner v. New York case, claimed that:  
[t]here is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The 
guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide 
department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to 
government the power to provide restrictive safeguards.
119
 
In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish case the Court provided also economic arguments for its 
decision. The Court claimed that female employees being the lowest paid class, with 
relatively weak bargaining power, were the «ready victims» of those who were in the position 
to take advantage of their unequal bargaining power. In turn, the exploitation of employees 
with unequal bargaining power, leaving them without a living wage, not only damages the 
health and well-being of these employees, but also creates a burden on society.
120
 
So, as was demonstrated, there was a period of time in the history of the USA, when freedom 
of contract principle had very different implications than what it has now. During so-called 
Lochner Era, in the name of the freedom of contract the USA courts proceeded to invalidate 
legal acts that were intended for protection of weaker parties, legal acts that without doubt 
were beneficial for the society in general. During that time in the name of the freedom of 
contract the USA courts, inter alia invalidated laws setting restrictions on minimum wage, 
maximum hour requirements, union participation, and the mining industry. Even laws 
connected with prohibition of shipment of goods produced in factories employing children, 
were not an exception. However, with the judgement in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish case 
the Lochner Era ended with its main arguments being overturned by the statement that is 
relevant also nowadays. According to this statement «[t]here is no absolute freedom to do as 
one wills or to contract as one chooses».121 Having outlined the most vivid historical cases in 
relation to freedom of contract principle, the Thesis proceeds to analyze scholarly opinions on 
Lochner Era cases. 
3.2.2. Opinions on Lochner Era 
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Lochner Era cases indeed generated a lot of controversy. Even among its contemporaries. For 
example, Justice Harlan in his dissent criticized this judgement as, in his opinion, it did not 
adequately address legitimate interest of the government in the health and safety of its 
citizens.
122
 In turn, Justice Holmes dissented in Adair v. United States case, claiming that the 
right to make contract at will was stretched to its extremes. According to Justice Holmes the 
word «liberty» in the Constitutional amendments from which the right to make contract at 
will was derived simply aimed to prohibit the stronger party from taking advantage of the 
weaker party by exacting certain undertakings or unjustly discriminating.
123
 
Lochner Era judgments continued to attract academic attention many years after they were 
first issued. They are widely discussed even now. For example, D. P. Weber, when 
considering Lochner v. New York case claimed that such approach of the Court, where it 
aimed to ensure even playing field free from restrictions, was only seemingly neutral. In fact, 
lack of regulative norms benefited the party with greater bargaining power.
124
 At the same 
time, he stated that while certainly not advocating for the return of Lochner Era jurisprudence, 
he still supported freedom of contract as the basic right to conclude agreements in order to 
acquire or dispose of possessions and services, or change legal relationships in any other 
way.
125
 
D. P. Weber’s opinion is in line with the statements made by the Court in Moore v. East 
Cleveland case. The Court claimed that even though Lochner Era judgments demonstrated 
that in certain cases legislative intervention was required, freedom of contract principle still 
without a doubt was one of the pillars of modern commercial society.
126
 The Court stated that 
Lochner Era jurisprudence «counsels caution and restraint (…) [i]t does not counsel 
abandonment».127 
There are also modern academics, who consider Lochner v. New York case even more 
favorably than D. P. Weber. For example, D. N. Mayer considers Lochner v. New York case 
as a legitimate attempt on the part of judiciary to protect a constitutional rule that ensures that 
individuals have the right to conclude contracts freely from the government willing to 
arbitrarily exercise its power. D. N. Mayer claims that the Supreme Court of the USA in 
Lochner v. New York case was safeguarding the principle of freedom of contract as a 
fundamental right and not promoting the laissez-faire constitutionalism as claimed by Justice 
Holmes and his supporters.
128
 
Another modern academic A. S. McCaskey brings another perspective on freedom of contract 
principle. Presenting Lochner v. New York case as a thesis for the defense of the freedom of 
contract principle and Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls case
129
 as an antithesis for this 
principle, A. S. McCaskey supports neither of these approaches. He claims that both of them 
have shortcomings. He considers the dangers of not only unlimited freedom of contract, but 
also of unlimited governmental interference with the freedom of contract principle. Pursuant 
to A. S. McCaskey unlimited power of the legislative branch of government to pass legal acts 
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resulted in an astounding increase of state and federal regulations in the USA, which 
«contributes to the stagnant growth in business and lagging productivity marked by today's 
economy as well as other adverse consequences».130 Therefore, A. S. McCaskey supports 
neither approach, but rather their synthesis. 
This Section demonstrated that Lochner Era judgements indeed generated a lot of 
controversy, when they were first issued and they still continue to attract attention of 
academics now. Noteworthy, that while the majority of academics recognize the dangers of 
Lochner Era jurisprudence with its corresponding unlimited freedom of contract, at the same 
time, the majority of academics still consider freedom of contract to be an important concept. 
Conclusion 
A look into historical development of the freedom of contract principle revealed experiences 
of the past that need to be remembered in order not to repeat mistakes already once made. 
During so-called Lochner Era, in the name of the freedom of contract, the USA courts 
proceeded to invalidate legal acts that were intended for protection of weaker parties. In the 
name of the freedom of contract, the courts failed to preserve even minimal safeguards 
essential for the society. While these decisions were taken with the objective to ensure even 
playing field free from restrictions, in fact Lochner Era judgements manifested as 
representation of unequal bargaining power of different classes, i.e. superior bargaining 
position of the empowered class and the economic insecurities of the working class.
131
 
However, despite dangers of Lochner Era jurisprudence with its unlimited freedom of 
contract, many academics still consider freedom of contract, while definitely not an absolute, 
an important right. Very relevant is already mentioned statement made by the Court in Moore 
v. East Cleveland case. The Court stated that Lochner Era jurisprudence «counsels caution 
and restraint (…) [i]t does not counsel abandonment».132 Taking all this into consideration, it 
is crucial to find a balance between freedom of contract and the necessity for governmental 
intervention. In other words, it is crucial to determine in what circumstances freedom of 
contract principle shall prevail and when, on the other hand, governmental intervention is 
justified. This can be achieved only through in-depth analysis. 
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4. ASSESSING LIMITATIONS ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN LATVIA 
Chapter 3 established the need for in-depth analysis for determining, when freedom of 
contract principle should prevail, and, when, on the other hand, governmental intervention is 
justified. When assessing the limitation on the freedom of contract, it is especially important 
to apply the optimal evaluation methodology available. In this context, Chapter 4 introduces 
elaborate evaluation methodology used by the Constitutional Court of Latvia for assessing 
limitations on fundamental rights. Chapter 4 undertakes to establish that freedom of contract 
is a component of a fundamental right to freedom and therefore evaluation methodology used 
for assessing limitations on fundamental rights, can be used for assessing limitations on 
freedom of contract also.  
4.1. Freedom of contract as a component of a fundamental right to freedom 
Argument that freedom of contract is a component of general right to freedom finds support in 
the works of prominent scholars. For example, K. Torgāns, J. Kārkliņš and A. Bitāns state 
that in the state governed by the rule of law freedom of contract is a component of human 
freedom in its general meaning.
133
 Similarly, B. Blum also confirms that freedom of contract 
is a fundamental value – a component of person’s freedom.134  Further, H. N. Scheiber also 
claims that freedom of contact is a fundamental right that is often celebrated as the primary 
reason for the establishment of functional, market-based economy.
135
 
Furthermore, additional argument supporting the assumption that freedom of contract is a 
component of general right to freedom is found in previous discussion of post Lochner Era 
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cases. As was already mentioned in Chapter 3, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish case, the 
Court analyzing the minimum wage requirement for women, approached it as a question of 
liberty rather than freedom of contract.
136
 
In turn, if freedom of contract is a component of general right to freedom, similarly as other 
freedoms (such as political, social, economic and other freedoms), it is protected under the 
Constitution of Latvia, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union etc. This protection allows people to take the 
initiative in civil relationships, to choose course of action most suitable for them and solve 
their welfare issues. However, freedom is not solely the personal category, it is implemented 
in the society, where interest of other individuals also need to be respected.
137
 Therefore 
general right to freedom is also not absolute. 
In Sky Österreich GmbH v. Österreichischer Rundfunk case the European Court of Justice 
expressly confirms that Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union that proclaims «[t]he freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and 
national laws and practices» covers also the protection of freedom of contract.138 In one of the 
following cases Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v. Parkwood Leisure Ltd. case concerning 
the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the safeguarding of employees’ 
rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses, the European Court of Justice confirmed its previous conclusion. It affirmed its 
position that freedom of contract is a fundamental right protected under Article 16 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, in this case the 
European Court of Justice used freedom of contract principle in order to prohibit the domestic 
court from interpreting transposing European Union Directive in a way more beneficial to 
employees and trade unions.
139
 However, fundamental rights provided under the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union are also not absolute. Article 52 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union determines their scope. It lists criteria that must 
be met for the limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter 
to be legitimate. Firstly, any limitation must be provided for by law and it must respect the 
essence of rights and freedoms being limited. Secondly, limitations must be proportionate. 
Thirdly, limitations must be necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognized by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.
140
 
The Constitution of Latvia expressly protects various freedoms, e.g. it protects freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of previously announced 
peaceful meetings, street processions, and pickets, freedom of trade unions, the freedom of 
scientific research, artistic and other creative activity.
141
 While it does not expressly provide 
for freedom of contract, it is the case in respect of the majority of Constitutions of member 
states. Still, in many member states freedom of contract is understood as fundamental right 
covered under other constitutional provisions. For example, such is the case in Germany, 
where freedom of contract principle is derived from provisions protecting property, freedom 
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of occupation and general freedom of action.
142
 In turn, in Italy freedom of contract is 
considered a part of the freedom of economic initiative.
143
 So, while the Constitution of 
Latvia does not expressly provide for freedom of contract, it is reasonable to assume that 
similarly as in other member states this principles is covered under other constitutional 
provisions. 
Furthermore, Article 89 of the Constitution of Latvia proclaims that: 
[t]he State shall recognize and protect fundamental human rights in accordance 
with this Constitution, laws and international agreements binding upon 
Latvia.
144
 
One such legally binding instrument that establishes fundamental rights that must be 
respected both by the European Union and the member states when implementing European 
Union law is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. In turn, as already 
mentioned freedom of contract is expressly recognized by the European Court of Justice as a 
fundamental right covered by Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union. 
So, it follows that freedom of contract also falls under the definition of fundamental rights 
protected under the Constitution of Latvia. 
This Section established that freedom of contract is a component of the fundamental right to 
freedom. Therefore, evaluation methodology for assessing limitations on fundamental rights 
can be used also in assessing limitations put on freedom of contract principle. Taking this into 
consideration, next Section introduces evaluation methodology for assessing limitations on 
fundamental rights used in Latvia. 
4.2. Evaluation methodology for assessing limitations on fundamental rights 
In Latvia, evaluation methodology for assessing limitations on fundamental rights started to 
develop in 2000, when case No. 2000-03-01 was considered. In this case, evaluating the 
legitimacy of the legal act, the Constitutional Court of Latvia applied criteria found in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Namely, to be legitimate, limitations, firstly, must be 
provided for by law, secondly, must have legitimate aim, thirdly, must be necessary in a 
democratic society. In addition, the Constitutional Court of Latvia also evaluated whether 
limitations are proportionate to the legitimate aim.
145
 This evaluation methodology has further 
evolved and has been refined in further case law. Currently, the Constitutional Court of Latvia 
applies evaluation methodology that was first used in 2003 in case No. 2002-21-01.
146
 In 
accordance to this case the Constitutional Court of Latvia, when evaluating if a limitation on 
fundamental right is justified, needs to determine the following. Firstly, if a limitation on 
fundamental right is provided for by properly adopted law. Secondly, if a limitation has a 
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legitimate aim. Thirdly, if a limitation complies with proportionality principle or if selected 
means are proportionate to legitimate aim of a limitation.
147
 
For contested legal norm / act, that limits fundamental rights, to be recognized as compatible 
with the Constitution of Latvia, all listed criteria must be met. If the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia finds that at least one criteria is not met, the contested legal norm / act is recognized as 
unconstitutional.
148
 In order to better understand, when legal norm / act can be declared 
unconstitutional, current criteria for evaluation of limitations on fundamental rights, must be 
analyzed in detail. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 established that freedom of contract was a component of the fundamental right to 
freedom and therefore evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on fundamental 
rights, can be used for assessing limitations put on freedom of contract principle. Then 
Chapter 4 outlined this evaluation methodology and its main criteria. In turn, Chapter 5 will 
proceed to discuss each criterion in detail and apply them to the limitation on freedom of 
contract in case of transfer of an undertaking set in Article 20. 
 
5. APPLICATION OF EVALUATION METHODOLOGY TO LIMITATION ON FREEDOM 
OF CONTRACT IN CASE OF A TRANSFER OF AN UNDERTAKING 
Previous Chapters of the Thesis have demonstrated that freedom of contract, while a 
component of a fundamental right, is not an absolute right. In certain cases, limitations on 
freedom of contract principle are justified. So, the existence of the limitation on freedom of 
contract principle in Article 20 in itself does not make Article 20 incompatible with freedom 
of contract principle. What is crucial, is determining when freedom of contract principle and 
when governmental intervention needs to prevail. In order to answer this question, Chapter 4 
introduced evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on fundamental rights. In 
turn, Chapter 5 endeavors to apply each introduced evaluation criterion to the limitation on 
freedom of contract principle set in Article 20. In doing so, ultimately, Chapter 5 seeks to 
answer the research question, i.e. whether Article 20 is compatible with freedom of contract 
principle. 
5.1. Criterion I – properly adopted law 
The first criterion that is analyzed, is whether limitation on fundamental rights is set in 
properly adopted law. The Constitutional Court of Latvia clarified criteria for assessing 
whether law is properly adopted, inter alia in judgement No. 2008-12-01 of February 04, 
2009. For the contested legal norm / act to meet this criterion it needs to comply with the 
following requirements. Firstly, the law had to be adopted in compliance with the procedures 
established in normative acts. Secondly, the law had to be promulgated and publically 
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available in accordance with the requirements of normative acts. Thirdly, it needs to be 
expressed in a sufficiently clear manner. So, the individual can understand the content of the 
right and obligation arising out of the legal norm as well as envisage the consequences of its 
application.
149
  
To note, legal norms / acts are rarely recognized as unconstitutional on this basis. Usually, it 
happens only in cases, when the legislator has violated the authorization provided for by the 
law.
150
 Similarly, Article 20 meets this requirement. The Commercial Law itself as well as all 
its amendments were properly adopted and there is no indication that the procedure 
established in normative acts was breached in any way. Similarly, there is no indication that 
Article 20 was not promulgated and publically available in accordance with requirements of 
normative acts. So the second requirement is not contested.  
Third requirement, however, requires more in-depth analysis. Third criterion assesses if the 
law is expressed in a sufficiently clear manner. Similarly, the ECHR has repeatedly indicated 
that law limiting fundamental rights needs to be expressed in a sufficiently clear manner and 
be foreseeable. Namely, the legal norm needs to be expressed in such a way that an individual 
would be able to regulate his behavior.
151
 This ensures adequate safeguard for an 
individual.
152
 
At the time, this Thesis was started, it would have been argued that the law was not expressed 
in a sufficiently clear manner. Understanding what exactly was meant under the term 
«transfer of an undertaking» and whether transfer of an undertaking was taking place could be 
quite a challenge.
153
 Until recently, case law in relation to the transfer of an undertaking was 
very limited and ambiguous. For example, in the decision of March 10, 2014 in case 
No. C29715111, Rīga District Court recognized transfer of an undertaking, when SIA 
«Latvijas Keramika A» invested in equity capital of AS «Latvijas Keramika» its real estates 
as well as some movable assets.
154
 Rīga District Court has made such a decision even though 
the previous year, the Supreme Court of Latvia in the decision of November 5, 2013 in case 
No. C04367311 established that transfer of an undertaking did not take place even though 
SIA «Mežlejas» similarly as in previous case transferred to SIA «Cerība Pluss» both real 
estates and movable assets.
155
 This ambiguity resulted in many individuals not knowing 
whether what they were doing was in fact transfer of an undertaking. Consequently, 
individuals did not know whether liability rules set in Article 20 applied.  
However, it must be noted, that during the time this Thesis was being written, the Supreme 
Court of Latvia issued important judgements clarifying what criteria need to be assessed when 
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analyzing if transfer of an undertaking takes place. The Supreme Court of Latvia in the 
decision of November 09, 2017 in case No. SKC 340/2017 ruled that the following can 
indicate that transfer of an undertaking takes place: transfer of employees to the acquirer, 
transfer of assets and stocks, takeover of bank liabilities, transition of the board member of the 
transferor to the acquirer.
156
 
While, it is possible that in practice there can still be some uncertainties as to when transfer of 
an undertaking takes place and when it does not, mentioned decision of the Supreme Court of 
Latvia clarified a lot of uncertainties in relation to the ambiguous wording of Article 20. 
Taking this into consideration, it can be concluded that currently third requirement for the law 
to be considered properly adopted is met as well. 
This Section established that Article 20 met all three requirements of properly adopted law.  It 
did not provide arguments suggesting that Article 20 was not adopted in compliance with the 
procedures established in normative acts or was not promulgated and publically available in 
accordance with requirements of normative acts. On the other hand, in respect of the third 
requirement it was suggested that until recently there was much confusion in respect of 
understanding the meaning of the «transfer of an undertaking». However, considering that 
recently the Supreme Court of Latvia issued important judgement, clarifying this term, third 
requirement of properly adopted law is met as well. 
5.2. Criterion II – a legitimate purpose  
Second criterion for assessing limitation on fundamental rights set in Article 20, is whether 
this limitation has a legitimate purpose.  
The Constitutional Court of Latvia has repeatedly affirmed that at the basis of limitations on 
fundamental rights must be circumstances and arguments, justifying their necessity. The 
limitation may be imposed only for important reason – to achieve legitimate purpose.157 As 
legitimate purpose, the Constitutional Court of Latvia recognizes protection of other 
constitutional values.
158
 Article 116 of the Constitution of Latvia as legitimate aims, which 
can justify limitations of fundamental rights lists protection of the rights of other people, the 
democratic structure of the State, and public safety, welfare and morals. So, the purpose of 
Article 20, i.e. protection of creditors, falls under the protection of the rights of other people. 
Therefore, Article 20 has a legitimate purpose.  
However, while the purpose of Article 20 is legitimate, its general nature – protection of 
creditors brings additional questions. What is intended as legitimate purpose of Article 20 – is 
it protection of creditors in general or is it protection of creditors from fraudulent transfers (in 
fraudem creditorum) in particular. Such question appeared after taking a look at the European 
Contract Law. Chapter 2 of the Thesis demonstrated that in both European Contract Law and 
normative acts of the EU member states there were provisions limiting freedom of contract 
principle in particular for the protection of creditors against fraudulent transfers of assets 
intended to defraud creditors  
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While, regardless of the answer, the purpose of Article 20 remains legitimate, it may affect 
examination of other evaluation criteria used for assessing limitation on fundamental rights. In 
particular, it is can be important for assessing the second requirement of proportionality, i.e. if 
there is less restricting method available for achieving legitimate purpose. As will be 
demonstrated, assessment of this criterion depends also on the scope of the legitimate purpose 
of the limitation. Whether the legislators introduced this limitation generally for the protection 
of creditors or for the protection of creditors from fraudulent transfers, in particular. 
Having established legitimate purpose of Article 20 as falling under Article 116 of the 
Constitution of Latvia, i.e. protection of the rights of other people, another question arises. 
Does protection of rights of other people justify governmental intervention in all 
circumstances? Does all potential harm to third parties justify governmental intervention? In 
order to attempt to answer this question, introduction of certain economics terms is required. 
In economics terms, harm to third parties resulting from the contract to which they are not 
parties, is understood as externalities that impose costs.
159
 Welfare economists also recognize 
that there are costs produced by market transactions that parties to the transaction never pay. 
This creates a problem as because of externalities it is possible that concluded contracts result 
in greater social costs than benefits. Further, in most cases parties to the contract are not 
required to compensate third parties shouldering the burden of externalities. In order to 
remedy this market failure, the government in certain cases finds it necessary to interfere by 
limiting costs shouldered by third parties.
160
 
However, the majority of contracts result in some sort of third-party effect. For example, if 
person A concludes a contract for the sale of the rare painting with person B, person C, who 
wanted to add this painting to his collection, may end up very disappointed. Another example 
occurs if person A opens the bakery next to person’s B bakery and by offering lower prices 
and wider variety of goods proceeds to drive person B away from business. In such a 
situation, each transaction between person B and his customers adversely affects person A. In 
turn, person A concluding a contract for buying a new car causes an increase of pollution in 
the environment, which imposes costs on the society in general. Also, if person A buys the 
most tasteless garish outfit from the shop and then wears it, it may offend sense of taste of 
person B, thus adversely affecting him. These are just a few examples of contracts imposing 
costs on non-consenting third parties. However, if freedom of contract principle was to be 
restricted in order to avoid listed externalities, there would not be freedom of contract at all.
161
 
There are of course examples when third-party effects clearly have to limit freedom of the 
contract. One of the most vivid examples is an agreement between person A and person B to 
rob a bank. Also, clearly State Revenue Service may not appreciate an agreements between 
the employer and the employee, where parties undertake to hide the precise amount of 
employee’s income.162 So, as can be seen in certain cases governmental intervention is 
certainly required, while in other cases it would serve only to unnecessary restrict freedom of 
contract.  
So, solely the existence of externalities does not justify limiting freedom of contract. What is 
important, is what kind of externalities and under what circumstance justify limitations being 
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imposed on freedom of contract. Without doubt, the essential, but insufficient condition, is 
that the externality adversely affects certain person and causes him material harm. However, 
this is just a minimum threshold that alone does not justify limitation on freedom of contract. 
Meeting this threshold is not sufficient. Freedom of contract limitation is justified only, when, 
in addition, externalities cause the particular contract to become economically inefficient. 
This approach is based on the assumption that the main purpose of contracting is efficiency. 
The society benefits if parties contract in ways that are efficient even if these contracts 
produce externalities. For instance, if parties conclude a contract for building a major sport 
base, it has adverse effects – incessant noise, dust, and traffic impairment. On the other hand, 
the whole town will benefit from such a contract as it will make a city more vibrant and 
attractive to tourists.
163
 So, for the restriction on freedom of contract to be justified, existence 
of externalities is not sufficient. There must be such externalities that cause contract to be 
economically inefficient. 
So, the existence of the legitimate aim or in this case adverse-effects from which third party 
needs to be protected, is not enough. Question of efficiency must be also considered. This 
conclusion is in line with the evaluation methodology for assessing limitations on 
fundamental rights, even though in it the question of efficiency is approached from a different 
angle. In particular, evaluation of the third proportionality criteria also involves assessment, 
whether the measures taken by the legislators correspond to the particular issue, meaning 
whether the benefit to society from limitation imposed by the government on the freedom of 
contract principle outweighs adverse effects suffered by the individuals.
164
 So, assessment of 
the question of efficiency will be considered in relation to that criterion, and its evaluation is 
not required in connection to the legitimacy of the purpose.  
This section established that Article 20 had a legitimate purpose. Its purpose is the protection 
of creditors, which falls under the protection of the rights of other people. In turn, the 
Constitution of Latvia lists protection of the rights of other people as a legitimate purpose. 
However, while this Section established that purpose of Article 20 was legitimate, it also 
questioned its scope.  While not affecting the legitimacy of the purpose, whether Article 20 
was intended to protect creditors in general or protect them from fraudulent transfers in 
particular, is important for assessing other evaluation criteria, in particular, second 
requirement of proportionality. Further, this Section also demonstrated that existence of 
potential adverse-effects to people did not always justify governmental intervention. 
Governmental intervention is justified only if it is efficient. This conclusion, in turn, brings 
the Thesis to the discussion of the third evaluation criterion for assessing limitation on 
fundamental rights – proportionality. 
5.3. Criterion III – proportionality 
The last criterion that needs to be analyzed is proportionality of the limitation on fundamental 
rights. The limitation is considered to be proportionate if three following requirements are 
met. If at least one criterion is not met, it means that the contested legal norm /act does not 
comply with the proportionality principle. First requirement establishes that method 
designated by the legislator must be appropriate for achievement of the particular legitimate 
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purpose. Under the second requirement, it is assessed if there is other less disruptive method, 
with which the legitimate purpose may be achieved.  Lastly, under the third requirement it is 
assessed whether the measures taken by the legislators correspond to the particular issue.
165
 
5.3.1. Chosen method appropriate for achieving legitimate purpose 
In respect of the first criterion, it is evaluated if the method designated by the legislator is 
appropriate for achieving particular legitimate purpose. Meaning, it is evaluated whether 
legitimate purpose is in fact achieved through chosen method.
166
 This criterion is analyzed 
taking into consideration practical application of the contested legal norm / act.
167
 
Applying this criterion to the case of a transfer of an undertaking, it is assessed whether 
Article 20 achieves its legitimate purpose. Does it ensure protection of creditors?  
Article 20 certainly provides some safeguards to creditors in case of a transfer of an 
undertaking. It ensures that the main interest of the creditors, i.e. to redeem a debt, is not 
undermined in case of a transfer of an undertaking. Article 20 certainly improves chances of 
creditors to receive satisfaction in case of a transfer of an undertaking. Article 20 protects 
creditors by ensuring that in case of a transfer of an undertaking creditors get right to claim in 
respect of the acquirer, while for the period of time retaining right to claim in respect of the 
transferor also.
168
 
However, while Article 20 certainly protects creditors to some extent, there are also 
arguments that it does not fully achieve its purpose. For example, A. Strazds argues that 
regulation established in Article 20 does not fully achieve legislator’s intent – protections of 
the rights of third persons. He claims that there is no objective justification for the different 
treatment of obligations that arise prior to the transfer of the undertaking with the term for 
fulfilment being within five years after the transfer, for which solidary liability of the 
transferor and the acquirer is prescribed, and all other obligations, for which the acquirer has 
sole liability. Under this regulation the acquirer is solely liable for those obligations, whose 
term for fulfilment has set in before the transfer of an undertaking. As creditors’ consent to 
the transfer is not required, this provision may significantly prejudice creditors’ chances of 
repayment if the new debtor is worse off financially than the previous debtor.
169
 
Further, A. Strazds argues, that even though in accordance with Article 20 Part one the 
creditor is entitled to request from the acquirer of an undertaking the performance of an 
obligation, this right of the creditor is useless if a creditor is unaware of the transfer of an 
undertaking and in particular about the transfer of an obligation. This means that the ultimate 
goal of the legislators, i.e. protection of creditors’ rights is not fulfilled.170   
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While Article 20 certainly improves creditors chances at redeeming their debts in case of 
transfer of an undertaking, it does not fully achieve its legitimate purpose – protection of 
creditors. 
5.3.2. Less restricting method available for achieving legitimate purpose 
In respect of the second criterion, it must be analyzed if there is at least one less restricting 
method, with which the legitimate purpose can be achieved at least in the same amount.
171
 
The protection of creditors can be achieved through the variety of ways.
172
 One of alternative 
solutions for safeguarding creditor interests mentioned by Yedidia Z. Stern is disclosure 
requirement. Adverse effects to creditors may be limited by requiring shareholders of the 
debtor company to disclose all information about any potential wealth transfers that may have 
adverse effects on creditors to them.
173
 
For example, disclosure obligation is the core requirement in the framework of transfer of an 
undertaking under Lithuanian law. Under Lithuanian law, creditors must be informed before 
the transfer of an undertaking has taken place of future transfer. In Lithuania the transfer can 
take place only with consent of the creditor.
174
 
Disclosure obligation in case of a transfer of an undertaking is prescribed also in Article 562 
of the Civil Code of Russian Federation. It also prescribes that creditors have to be informed 
about the transfer prior to the conclusion of the agreement. If the creditor does not agree with 
the transfer of the debt to the acquirer he has options: 1) to request the up-front fulfillment of 
obligation, 2) to request termination of contract and reimbursement of loses or 3) to request to 
acknowledge the sale-purchase agreement or its part void within three months.
175
 
S. Grundmann also writes in support of mandatory disclosure rules. While, his work mostly 
concerns disclosure obligation with the aim to protect consumers, his arguments can be used 
in other contexts as well. S. Grundmann argues that mandatory disclosure rules do not limit 
parties’ autonomy but in fact promote it as they do not limit contractual conditions available. 
Pursuant to S. Grundmann such disclosure rules help market failure in the case of unavoidable 
information asymmetries, but simultaneously do not needlessly restrict market 
mechanisms.
176
 
Governmental intervention in economics is often justified by reference to market failure. 
S. Grundmann points to one type of market failure especially important for European Contract 
Law, namely, information asymmetries. He claims that information on relevant issues is 
required in order to reach rational wealth maximizing decision, consequently information is 
required for the functioning of markets.
177
 
However, it needs to be admitted that examples of disclosure procedures being implemented 
in Lithuanian and Russian legal systems, are even more restrictive than liability rule 
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prescribed in Article 20. In the case of Lithuania, the disclosure obligation goes hand in hand 
with the legal rule making transfer of an undertaking conditional on creditor’s consent. In 
turn, in the context of Russia, disclosure obligation goes together with the right to request to 
acknowledge the sale-purchase agreement or its part void. Both these options are even more 
restrictive than Latvian liability rule prescribed in Article 20. This rule just allocates liability, 
while the rules prescribed in Lithuanian and Russian legal systems give the creditor the power 
to break off the deal between the transferor and the acquirer. Taking this into consideration, 
less restricting method for protecting creditors in this case was not found. It means that the 
second criterion of proportionality is met.  
However, as was stated previously, there is another factor that affects assessment of this 
criterion. In order to assess if there is less restricting method available for achieving legitimate 
purpose, it is important, what exactly is the legitimate purpose of Article 20. Is it the 
protection of creditors in general or is it protection of creditors from fraudulent transfers in 
particular. If the legitimate purpose of Article 20 indeed is the general protection of creditors, 
then previous discussion does not reveal less restricting method available for achieving 
legitimate purpose. On the other hand, if the legitimate purpose of Article 20 is protection of 
creditors from fraudulent transfers in particular, then less restricting methods can be found 
both in European legal instruments as well as in national laws of EU member states. For 
example, this legitimate aim can be achieved by already existing right of the creditor to 
challenge any legal act made by the debtor with the intention to defraud the creditor. This way 
the creditors are protected from fraudulent contracts, but freedom of contract of honest 
transferors and acquirers is not violated. Examples of such provisions are included in a 
number of European legal instruments as well as in provisions of national law of EU member 
states. 
Article 1167 of the Proposals for Reform of the Law of Obligations and the Law of 
Prescription contains provision granting creditors the right to challenge any legal act made by 
the debtor with the intention to defraud the creditor. Also, Article 154 of the European Code 
of Contract Preliminary Draft stipulates that contracts drafted with the intent to defraud a 
creditor of one of the parties are not opposable to third parties (creditors). Similarly, provision 
aimed to protect creditors from fraud is found in the French Civil Code (fraude paulienne). 
Article 1167 states that creditors «may also, on their own behalf, attack transactions made by 
their debtor in fraud of their rights».178 Similarly, Italian law also has protective measures 
against fraudulent acts. Articles 2901 to 2904 of the Civil Code regulate action révocatoire in 
case of fraudulent acts. Similar provisions intended for safeguarding creditor rights are 
present inter alia also in Dutch law, Spanish law, Belgian law, Quebec law et al.
179
  
To conclude, whether the second criterion of proportionality is met, depends on the scope of 
the legitimate purpose of Article 20. If the legitimate purpose of Article 20 is the general 
protection of creditors then this criterion is met. The discussion has not revealed less 
restricting method available for achieving legitimate purpose. While disclosure obligation was 
suggested as less restrictive method, it was established that disclosure obligation alone was 
not sufficient. Usually it goes together with provisions making transfer of an undertaking 
conditional on creditor’s consent. In turn, such provisions are even more restrictive than 
liability rule set in Article 20. On the other hand, if the legitimate purpose of Article 20 is 
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protection of creditors from fraudulent transfers in particular, then there are less restrictive 
methods for achieving this legitimate purpose. One example of such less restrictive measure is 
provision granting the creditors the right to challenge any legal act made by the debtor with 
the intention to defraud the creditor. Examples of such provisions can be found both in 
European legal instruments as well as in national laws of EU member states. Such provisions 
protect creditors from fraudulent contracts, but do not infringe on freedom of contract of 
honest transferors and acquirers. 
5.3.3. Net effect of the limitation 
Lastly, when evaluating whether limitation is proportionate, it is necessary to consider if 
measures taken by the legislators correspond to the particular issue. It requires contrasting 
adverse effects imposed on individuals due to restriction on their fundamental rights, with the 
benefit to the society in general. It is assessed, whether the benefit to society outweighs 
adverse effects suffered by individuals.
180
 
Analysis of this criterion in fact involves the performance of efficiency analysis. In law and 
economics efficiency is generally understood as either Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
Pareto efficiency is achieved if everyone is made better off without making anyone worse off. 
However, considering that in most cases it is impossible, achieving Pareto efficiency is also 
impossible. In turn, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is achieved if the net benefit exceeds the net 
harm including externalities.
181
 So, the evaluation of this criterion of proportionality involves 
evaluating whether Article 20 is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
Benefit to society 
Existence of such test ensures that government has the right to limit freedom of contract only 
if it is efficient. In order to determine if Article 20 is efficient it is necessary to compare 
benefit to society resulting from Article 20 with adverse effect suffered by the transferor and 
the acquirer due to their freedom of contract being restricted. 
Firstly, it can be argued that the society in general benefits from Article 20 as it is 
advantageous for the economy of the state. It has been argued that improved creditor 
protection can increase output, investment, and credit penetration.
182
 
Secondly, in this case, benefit to society resulting from Article 20 means benefit to creditors. 
This Article ensures that the main interest of creditors, i.e. to redeem a debt is not undermined 
in case of a transfer of an undertaking. 
However, in order to correctly assess benefit to the creditors resulting from Article 20, the 
adverse effect that creditors could have suffered in the absence of it, needs to be looked at. As 
was previously mentioned, in the absence of Article 20 creditors’ ability to redeem the debt 
could be undermined. Consequently, Article 20 ensures that the ability of creditors to receive 
satisfaction is not adversely affected. However, this seemingly great benefit is reduced 
significantly, if creditors themselves are able to ensure protection of their rights.  
For example, Yedidia Z. Stern argues that already at the initial stages of negotiations creditors 
know about existing agency problem, meaning that shareholders of the debtor company have 
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different goals from that of creditors and their business decisions may have some adverse 
effect on creditors. Knowing this, creditors may take precautions already at the initial stage, 
when issuing the loan to the debtor. Creditors may carefully draft loan agreements including 
in them clauses ensuring protection in case of certain events. Creditors may also set an 
increased interest rate covering the potential future risks.
183
 
However, Yedidia Z. Stern provides also opposing arguments. Firstly, the assumption that 
creditors are aware of the potential risks and can integrate them into the contact is true only 
for contract creditors. It does not apply to involuntarily creditors such as consumers, tax 
authorities, etc. Secondly, Yedidia Z. Stern argues that not all creditors have the possibility to 
adequately protect themselves from future risks. In many cases, only large and influential 
creditors, for example, such as banks, have an opportunity to draft complicated contracts with 
incorporated safeguards and have commercial power to set high compensating interest 
rates.
184
 
Similarly, Aditi Bagchit states that contract creditors are not the group of third parties most 
deserving of protection, as creditors are able to assess the possibility of non-payment when 
first entering into contract and accordingly price this risk into the contract. However, similarly 
as Yedidia Z. Stern, she agrees that it is different for creditors, who are unable to price the risk 
of non-payment into the initial contract.
185
 
So, when analyzing benefit to the creditors resulting from Article 20 it is important to 
distinguish between creditors who are able to protect themselves through carefully drafted 
loan agreements and increased interest rates and non-contract creditors, who have no way to 
protect themselves from possible adverse effects of transfer of an undertaking. Article 20 
obviously results in great benefit to non-contract creditors as otherwise they would not have 
other means of protection. In turn, benefit of Article 20 to contract creditors is not so very 
great, as these creditors are able to take necessary precautionary measures themselves.   
So, as was discussed, Article 20 indeed is beneficial to society in general and creditors in 
particular. Firstly, it has been argued that improved creditor protection can increase output, 
investment, and credit penetration and consequently stimulate economy. Secondly, Article 20 
is beneficial to creditors themselves as well. However, resulting benefit is much greater for 
non-contract creditors, who cannot protect themselves from possible adverse effects of a 
transfer of an undertaking in any other way. In turn, benefit to contract creditors is not so very 
great, as these creditors are able to take necessary precautionary measures themselves already 
at the initial stages of negotiations.   
Adverse effects 
As was demonstrated, governmental interference in the form of Article 20 indeed has some 
benefits. However, it may has adverse effects as well. 
In this context, R. Coase argues against the necessity of governmental intervention in case of 
externalities. He illustrates his opinion by providing an example of the rancher and the farmer, 
where rancher’s cattle damages farmer’s crop. The government reacts by imposing the fine on 
the rancher.  However, what is noteworthy is that the decision to restrain the rancher by fining 
him may result in as much harm as the harm initially done to the farmer. So, here the main 
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social issue is not to find the best way to restrain the rancher, but rather, to determine what 
harm is greater in the context of allocation of productive resources. In this case, the choice is 
between the meet and the crops. However, only the farmer and the rancher themselves can 
adequately assess the value of each. So, if the rancher considers the value of cattle to be 
relatively high, he will find a way to come to an agreement with the farmer, for example, by 
paying him off, or by bargaining with the farmer some other way. Therefore, governmental 
intervention at best is ineffective and at worst damages the equilibrium that the market could 
achieve itself. While this example is based on the unrealistic assumption of competitive 
market free of transaction costs and supplied with perfect information, in more realistic world 
in certain circumstances governmental intervention may compensate for certain market 
failures. However, even so, the necessity of governmental intervention must be carefully 
assessed. In most cases governmental intervention creates new costs that were not present 
before.
186
 However, R. Coase’s example, does not concern measures taken by the government 
in order to protect third parties and therefore his argument about rancher and farmer being 
able to find market equilibrium themselves does not work in the context of measures intended 
for creditor protection. Creditors are not parties to the contract and therefore cannot influence 
the terms of the contract. However, R. Coase’s example is still valuable as it illustrates that 
sometimes governmental intervention can result in as much harm / or even more harm than 
what was present initially. 
In this case, governmental intervention for the protection of creditors embodied in Article 20 
certainly has not only benefits, but adverse effects as well.  Firstly, there are costs that this 
Article imposes on the transferor and the acquirer of an undertaking by limiting their freedom 
of contract. Secondly, this Article may also impose additional costs on the acquirer of an 
undertaking. While Article 20 focuses on the potential risks to the creditors, it completely 
ignores the potential risks to the acquirer of an undertaking that can arise due to the transfer. 
This Article imposes solidary liability of the transferor and the acquirer of an undertaking in 
respect of liabilities, which originated before the transfer of the undertaking. Therefore, if the 
transferor was not fully honest, the acquirer may end up being solidary liable for liabilities he 
knew nothing about. Further, Article 20 ensures that even if the transferor and the acquirer 
conclude an agreement releasing the acquirer from the liability for obligation that arose before 
transfer of an undertaking, the creditor can still choose to ask satisfaction from / bring a claim 
against the acquirer. In this case, the acquirer would be obligated to fulfill the obligation in 
accordance with the law. 
Further, Article 20 imposes costs not only on the parties to the contract for transferring of an 
undertaking, but on the society in general as well.  
It is widely accepted that legal environment has an impact on the financial development of a 
state and legal environment present in merger and acquisition market is not an exception. In 
order to expand the states economies and enhance business performances many states develop 
laws for the regulation of mergers and acquisition.
187
 In turn, Article 20 may make Latvian 
asset purchase deals less attractive for potential investors. Firstly, even though after 
previously discussed judgement of the Supreme Court of Latvia some ambiguity related to 
distinguishing between genuine asset deal and transfer of undertaking was cleared, some 
uncertainty in relation to the interpretation of this provision remains. Article 20 can still make 
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potential acquirers question whether what they are doing is transfer of an undertaking and 
whether they will be liable for certain connected obligations. Such legal confusion may 
certainly play a role in dissuading potential acquirers from concluding asset purchase deals.  
Furthermore, even if the acquirer knows that what he is doing constitutes transfer of an 
undertaking, Article 20 imposing solidary liability, can result in acquirer deciding against 
concluding the contract. Such is the case if the acquirer is not ready to rely on the honesty of 
the transferor about obligations of the undertaking and deal with lengthy legal proceedings in 
case of dishonesty. In this context the opinion of American professor Marie T. Reilly is 
relevant, according to whom the rule of non-liability is said to promote alienability of 
property.
188
 So, liability rule set in Article 20 may have detrimental effect on the willingness 
of potential acquirers to conclude contracts for the transfer of an undertaking and 
consequently on numbers of acquisition deals structured as transfers of an undertaking. This, 
in turn, has adverse effects on the society in general.  
To sum up, Article 20 has a number of adverse effects. Firstly, this Article imposes costs on 
the transferor and the acquirer of an undertaking by limiting their freedom of contract. 
Secondly, this Article also imposes additional costs on the acquirer of an undertaking by 
failing to adequately protect him from possible fraud on the part of the transferor. Due to this 
Article the acquirer may end up being solidary liable for liabilities he knew nothing about. 
Thirdly, Article 20 imposes costs not only on the parties to the contract, but on the society in 
general as well. This Article may have detrimental effect on the willingness of potential 
acquirers to conclude contracts for the transfer of an undertaking. Firstly, there still is some 
ambiguity in relation to what exactly constitutes transfer of an undertaking and consequently 
whether an acquirer in particular case is liable for certain connected obligations. Secondly, the 
acquirer knowing that what he is acquiring is an undertaking, may not want to deal with any 
possible connected obligations. Further, he may not be ready to rely on the honesty of the 
transferor about obligations of the undertaking and deal with lengthy legal proceedings in case 
of dishonesty. Both these factors may have detrimental effect on the willingness of potential 
acquirers to conclude contracts for the transfer of an undertaking and consequently on the 
financial development of a state in general and merger and acquisition market in particular.  
When assessing whether Article 20 meets last criteria of proportionality, it was established 
that Article 20 had both benefits and adverse effects. In order for Article 20 to meet last 
criteria of proportionality, the benefit must outweigh adverse effects. The result of 
comparison depends on the values one attaches to particular benefits and adverse effects and 
requires economic analysis, which was not the objective of this Thesis. However, what was 
demonstrated, was that each benefit of Article 20 was out-shadowed by the corresponding 
adverse effect. Benefit to creditors was out shadowed by costs being imposed on the 
transferor and the acquirer, especially acquirer. In turn, benefit to the economy of the state, 
resulting from possible increase in output, investment, and credit penetration was out-
shadowed by the corresponding adverse effect on the same economy resulting from decreased 
number of acquisition deals structured as transfer of an undertaking. Adverse effect on the 
financial development of a state in general and merger and acquisition market in particular. 
Taking this into consideration, it cannot be concluded that the benefit resulting from Article 
20 outweighs adverse effects. Therefore, last criterion of proportionality is not met. 
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Conclusion 
In order to determine, whether limitation on freedom of contract set in Article 20 was 
justified, Chapter 5 applied evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on 
fundamental rights to Article 20. Each criterion of this evaluation methodology was analyzed. 
Firstly, it was established that Article 20 met all three requirements of properly adopted law. 
Therefore, Article 20 meets the first evaluation criteria. Further, Chapter 5 demonstrated that 
Article 20 had a legitimate purpose and therefore complied with second evaluation criterion. 
However, having established the existence of legitimate purpose, Chapter 5 also questioned 
the scope of this purpose. The scope of the legitimate purpose turned out to be crucial for 
assessing second requirement of proportionality (third evaluation criterion). It was established 
that, whether the second criterion of proportionality was met, depended on the scope of the 
legitimate purpose of Article 20. The discussion has not revealed less restricting method 
available for achieving general protection of creditors. On the other hand, less restrictive 
measures for achieving protection of creditors from fraudulent transfers were demonstrated. 
Further, Article 20 did not meet the first requirement of proportionality, as it was 
demonstrated that Article 20 did not fully achieve protection of creditors. Finally, after 
performing cost-benefit analysis it was concluded that each benefit of Article 20 was out-
shadowed by the corresponding adverse effect. Therefore, it could not be established that the 
benefit resulting from Article 20 outweighed its adverse effects. Therefore, last criterion of 
proportionality is not met. Therefore, considering that Article 20 does not meet some 
evaluation criteria, Article 20 is not justified. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Thesis attempted to find an answer to the research question whether Article 20 was 
compatible with freedom of contract principle.  
Chapter 1 started the discussion by analyzing the limitation put on freedom of contract 
principle in case of a transfer of an undertaking set in Article 20. Chapter 1 established that 
the purpose of such limitation was protection of creditors. Having established the existence of 
the limitation on freedom of contract and its purpose, the Thesis moved research to freedom 
of contract principle.  
In Chapter 2, the Thesis proceeded to define freedom of contract principle and outline its 
scope. Then it proceeded to analyze the way freedom of contract principle manifested in 
contemporary legal framework, both in Latvian normative acts and European Contract Law. 
The analysis determined that, while freedom of contract was a component of a fundamental 
right, it was not an absolute right. In certain cases, limitations on freedom of contract 
principle are justified. So, the existence of the limitation on freedom of contract principle in 
Article 20 in itself does not make Article 20 incompatible with freedom of contract principle. 
What is crucial, is determining when freedom of contract principle and when governmental 
intervention needs to prevail. 
Continuing the discussion on freedom of contract principle, Chapter 3 studied origins and 
philosophical underpinnings of freedom of contract principle and analyzed the most vivid 
historical case law related to this principle. A look into historical development of freedom of 
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contract principle indicated the need for balance between freedom of contract principle and 
the necessity of governmental interference. It also suggested the need for in-depth analysis for 
determining when limitations on freedom of contract principle were justified and when, on the 
other hand, freedom of contract principle should prevail.  
For this purpose, Chapter 4 introduced elaborate evaluation methodology used by 
Constitutional Court of Latvia for assessing limitations on fundamental rights. Chapter 4 
established that freedom of contract was a component of fundamental right to freedom and 
therefore evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on fundamental rights, could 
be used for assessing limitations put on freedom of contract principle. 
Chapter 5 proceeded to apply introduced evaluation methodology to the limitation on freedom 
of contract set in Article 20. All introduced evaluation criteria were analyzed. It was 
established that Article 20 complied with two evaluation criteria. Firstly, it is a properly 
adopted law. Secondly, it has a legitimate purpose. However, Article 20 does not comply with 
proportionality criteria.  Firstly, Article 20 does not meet the first requirement of 
proportionality, as it was demonstrated that Article 20 did not fully achieve protection of 
creditors. Secondly, there is some ambiguity, whether second requirement of proportionality 
is met. It depends on the scope of the legitimate purpose of Article 20. The discussion has not 
revealed less restrictive method available for achieving general protection of creditors. On the 
other hand, less restrictive measures for achieving protection of creditors from fraudulent 
transfers were demonstrated. Finally, it was concluded that third requirement of 
proportionality was not met as well. After performing cost-benefit analysis it was 
demonstrated that each benefit of Article 20 was out-shadowed by the corresponding adverse 
effect. Therefore, it could not be established that the benefit resulting out of Article 20 
outweighed its adverse effects.  
To conclude, considering that freedom of contract, while a component of fundamental, is not 
an absolute right, the existence of the limitation on freedom of contract principle in Article 20 
in itself does not make Article 20 incompatible with freedom of contract principle. Limitation 
is incompatible only if unjustly limiting freedom of contract. In this Thesis in order to 
determine whether limitation on freedom of contract included in Article 20 was justified, 
evaluation methodology used for assessing limitations on fundamental rights was applied. The 
analysis demonstrated that one out of three evaluation criteria was not met, therefore it was 
concluded that Article 20 was not compatible with freedom of contract principle.  
Having reached the conclusion that Article 20 is not compatible with freedom of contract 
principle, the next step is to develop legal rule in respect of allocation of liability in case of 
transfer of an undertaking, if any, that in fact is compatible with freedom of contract principle 
and simultaneously provides sufficient protection to unrelated third parties as well. While, the 
objective of this Thesis was merely to analyses the compatibility of Article 20 with freedom 
of contract principle and not to find the ultimate legal solution to the allocation of liability in 
case of transfer of an undertaking, this topic is recommended for further research. 
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